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PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
ROBERT G. VAUGHN*

Open and competitive examination is generally perceived as the
surest method of ensuring that public employees are selected on the
basis of their merit and ability. Since the Pendleton Act of 1883,
legislation has continually attempted to implement the view that efficient and impartial public sector employment requires that qualifications be demonstrated in an objective examination. But blacks,
women and other minorities have been systematically excluded from
public employment. This exclusion has resulted not only from bias in
the examination, but also from other less visible aspects of the appointment process which supplant strict merit selection.
A major exception to merit selection is the preference afforded veterans. This preference has withstood much criticism, and could have
a substantial positive impact on civil service reform when properly
administered, despite its inconsistency with strict merit selection. A
comparable concept of preferences for minority group members similarly could benefit the civil service system. To properly appreciate
the potential advantages of preferences for minority group members,
it is necessary to understand the theory and application of the merit
system, the operation of and justifications for the veterans' preference, and the effect of preferences on the merit system. This article
will discuss those subjects and then proceed to discuss the impact of a
minority preference on the merit system.
I. THEORY OF COMPETITIVE EXAMINATIONS
Reform of the civil service system in the United States has historically relied upon the notion of an open and competitive examination.
One observer has commented that "[tihe cornerstone of public personnel systems is built upon competitive examinations." 1 The Civil
Service Act of 18832 introduced competitive examinations into the
* B.A., 1966; J.D., 1969, University of Oklahoma; LL.M., 1970, Harvard University;
Associate Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. This article is based upon material which will appear in PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW, to
be published in 1976.
1. 0. STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL AI)MINISTRATION 114 (6th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as STAHL].
2. Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (codified in various sections of 5, 18, & 40 U.S.C.).
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federal civil service and provided the incentive for the adoption of
competitive examinations by state and local governments. 3 The Act
provided that the Civil Service Commission (CSC) should aid the
President in preparing suitable rules to, among other purposes, provide "as nearly as conditions of good administration will warrant...
for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants
. ...

4

Positions were to be filled from those receiving the high-

est grades. 5 Competitive examinations for appointment were thus
equated with civil service reform and with the merit system.
Open, competitive examinations were designed as a method of fulfilling the basic purposes of civil service reform: first, an efficient and
effective public service, and second, the impartial administration of
the laws. It was thought that selection on the basis of merit would not
only ensure efficient and effective public service but also insulate
public employees from inappropriate political influences. 6 Much of
this article is an assessment of the extent to which the open and competitive examination process has been successful in achieving these
two goals.
A.

Competitive and Excepted Services

Despite the emphasis placed on written examinations, much of the
civil service is exempted from examination requirements; furthermore, many of the competitive examinations are not written. First,
Congress has specifically exempted a number of federal agencies from
the Civil Service Act and the requirements of competitive examinations. 7 Even if an agency has not been so exempted, it need not fill all
of its positions on the basis of competitive examinations. The Civil
Service Act grants authority to the President to prescribe rules excepting "necessary" positions from the competitive service. 8
Pursuant to that authority, the CSC has excepted certain positions
in addition to those "of a confidential or policy-determining character
3. The first state civil service law was enacted in New York the same year as the
federal act. H. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF CIVIL SERVICE 22 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
KAPLAN]. State supreme courts have upheld their respective merit selection systems on
the basis that the "eradication of evil" in civil service is properly within the scope of
legislative authority. E.g., Buell v. Frear, 146 Wis. 291, 301, 131 N.W. 832, 834 (1911).
4. Ch. 27, § 2(2), 22 Stat. 403 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1970)).
5. Id. at 404 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3318 (1970)).
6. Political abuses of the spoils system were the motivating forces behind enactment
of the 1833 Act. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 1-12. The author even suggests that the Civil
War might have ended earlier but for the spoils system of appointment; military and
civilian administration was hampered greatly by political appointees. Id. at 6.
7. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 536 (1970) (exempting all positions in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).

8.

5 U.S.C. § 3302 (1970).
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9 Among these posifor which it is not practicable to examine .....
tions are chaplains, 10 cooks, 1 1 attorneys, 12 and local physicians,
surgeons or dentists employed under contract or on a part-time or fee
basis. 13 Other positions generally exempted include certain kinds of
intermittent or part-time employment, 14 summer employment,' 5 professional and scientific consultant positions, 1 6 and employment designed to serve as rehabilitation. 17 The CSC also uses this exemption8
to exclude a number of specific positions in individual agencies.1
Other positions are exempted because they are of a character for
which it is not practicable to examine applicants competitively, but
the applicants are "subject to such noncompetitive examination as
may be prescribed by the Commission."' 9 Under this exemption the
Commission has excluded many specific positions in particular
agencies. 20 It has also exempted certain positions filled by qualified
21
student trainees throughout the civil service.
A substantial number of enumerated positions are exempted because they are of a confidential or policy-determining character. 22 The
justification for this exemption, first instituted during the Eisenhower
Administration, is that certain positions are so closely tied to policy
formulation and policy justification that an administration is entitled
to have them filled by individuals who share its views or in whom it
has particular confidence as spokesmen for its viewpoint. 23 These are
overtly political jobs and the exemptory sections of the Code of Federal Regulations enumerating them are often referred to as the "plum
24
book."
The appropriate use of these exemptions in federal independent
regulatory agencies has been disputed. Because they have legislative,
9. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3101 (1976) (referred to as Schedule A).
10.
11.
12.

Id.

§ 213.3102(a).
Id. § 213.3102(b).
Id. § 213.3102(d).

1:3. Id. § 213.3102(n) (if the CSC believes that a competitive examination is impracticable).
14. Id. §§213.3102(g), (i), (m)(1), (w).
15. Id. §§ 213.3102(v), (y).
16. Id. §§ 213.3102(l), (o), (aa).

17. Id. §§213.3102(h), (x).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
(1975)
24.

Id. §§ 213.3103-.:3199.
Id. § 21:3.3201 (referred to as Schedule B).
Id. §§ 213.3202-.3276.
Id. § 213.3202(a).
Id. §§ 21:3.3303-.3399 (referred to as Schedule C).
R. VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR
[hereinafter cited as VAUGHN].
Id.
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judicial and executive powers, such agencies should be independent
of both the executive and legislative branches. Since the agencies are
exercising delegated legislative power, independence from the executive is particularly important. It would be inappropriate for an agency
independent of the executive to have its applicants for exempt
policymaking positions politically cleared by that branch. While this
exemption might be necessary for the appointment of certain agency
personnel, its purpose is to provide a confidential spokesman for the
independent agency rather than the executive. This issue was raised
by the CSC's refusal to clear the appointment of individuals to exempt positions in the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
on the ground that the persons were politically unacceptable to the
President. When the CPSC asserted its right to appoint individuals
regardless of their political acceptability to the President, the CSC
recharacterized the positions as being exempt under Schedule A
rather than as exempt as confidential or policymaking positions and
25
therefore not subject to political clearance.
B.

Design & Administration

CSC regulations require a rational relationship between performance in the position to be filled and the examination used to select
the individual for the position. 26 All examinations must: 1) be practical and, to the degree possible, relate to matters that fairly test the
capacity and fitness of candidates for the jobs to be filled; 2) result in
selection from among the best qualified applicants; 3) be developed
and used without discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, partisan political affiliation or other nonmerit grounds;
and 4) insure to the candidate opportunity for appeal or administrative review as appropriate.2 7 The first objective of ensuring that a test

actually measures required job skills is the most difficult to achieve
since it requires a proven relationship between the test and performance on the job. 2 8 The validity of a test is established by adminis-

tering it to those already on the job and by follow-up studies of ap29
plicants who achieve high scores and are placed in the position.
Considerable doubt remains as to the validity of the written civil service examination and its application to competitively appointed posi25. For a record of the exchange see BNA PROD. SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. at 3-4
(Jan. 4, 1974); id. at 77-78 (Feb. 1, 1974); id. at 405 (May 10, 1974).
26. 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(b) (1976).
27. Id. § 300.102.
28. STAHL, supra note 1, at 117-18.
29. See notes 182-85 & accompanying text infra.
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tions. 30 However, despite popular conception, many of the examinations for competitive positions are not written.
A performance examination is often administered in lieu of a written examination to test job skills such as typing. 3 1 These performance
tests are the easiest to validate because the work performed is readily

quantifiable.

32

A third kind of examination for competitive positions is actually not
an examination at all, but consists of a summary of educational and
vocational experience. 3 3 These "unassembled examinations" are the

most difficult to validate chiefly because standardized criteria for assessing the infinite variables in an applicant's background are
lacking. 34 The unassembled examination lends itself to another sort of
abuse. By expertly drafting the qualification requirements and by advising a certain candidate in advance of publication of the require35
ments, an agency can preselect a candidate.
After the test is developed, the geographic area is determined from
which applications will be accepted. This area will vary depending
upon the position and the nature of the office. 30 For example, appli-

cations are accepted nationwide for some technical and professional
positions. For some positions in field offices the area from which applications are accepted may be quite limited. Announcements are always made within the appropriate geographic area to ensure that individuals are aware of the examination opportunity.
30.
31.

See notes 160-205 & accompanying text infra.
D. HARVEY, THE CIVIL SERVICE COxMISSION 51 (1970) [hereinafter cited as

HARVEY].
32. STAHL,_supra note 1, at 117-18.

33. HARVEY, .supra note 31, at 51. The author states that
[ilor most jobs above the entrance level, no written test is given; only experience or
education, or sometimes both, are evaluated. So that a person who has come prepared with advanced education is not penalized for the time thus spent, four years
of education are normally allowed to substitute for three years of experience. Again,
the measuring device must allow a means of evaluating the experience of the various candidates in such a way that they can be given relative rankings. Sometimes,
however, it is necessary to test aptitudes or skills as well as evaluate experience
and education.
Id.
34. STAHL, supra note 1, at 121.
The rating of training and previous work history is considered more difficult than
rating assembled tests, because of such problems as (1) standardizing the evaluation
process, (2) securing equal performance by the examiners, (3) providing in the rating guide for many permutations and combinations of education and experience, (4)
recognizing variability and qualitative factors in experience, and (5) recognizing the
relevance of experience not provided for in the rating standard.
Id.
35. VAUGHN, supra note 23, at 135.
36. U.S. CIVIL SERV1CE CONIM'N, FED. PERSONNEL MAN. ch. 332, at 2-1 (Mar. 1974).
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C. Role of the Appointing Authority
While the CSC has responsibility for administering the examinations and establishing other requirements for applicants such as age,
citizenship and education, 37 the appointing officers within each
agency have final authority to hire candidates. 38 Although this authority is broad, appointing officers must "exercise [their] discretion in all
personnel actions solely on the basis of merit and fitness and without
regard to political or religious affiliations, marital status, or race." 39
The Civil Service Act required that appointments be "made from
among those graded highest," but it did not limit first consideration
to the top three names. A policy of doing so, however, was adopted
early, 40 and later it was embodied in a statutory "Rule of Three" requirement included in the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.41 Most
merit systems presently permit the certification of at least three
names to the appointing official so that he may consider any of the
various personal factors critical to job performance when making his
4
decision . 2
When an agency wishes to fill a position requiring use of a register,
it notifies the CSC which submits a list-"a certificate of eligibles"
-to the agency. The position must be filled from those applicants
certified from the register unless those certified are unavailable or the
agency can demonstrate to the CSC that- some of the candidates are
43
unqualified generally or are unqualified for the particular position.
In addition, an agency may object to a certified candidate on the
ground of physical or mental fitness4 4 or on the ground that the applicant fails to meet specified suitability standards relating to character and loyalty. 45 The CSC itself may require the removal of an em37.
38.
39.
40.

5 C.F.R. § 2.1(a) (1976).
Id. § 7.1.
Id.
HARVEY, supra note 31, at 55. Another observer states:

In 1871 the attorney general ruled that it was unconstitutional to require the highest scorer to be appointed because the Constitution gave the appointing power to
the president, courts, and department heads, and some discretion was necessary.
The opinion eventually became the basis of the "rule of three" which is used at the
present time.
D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 82 n.40 (1971).
41. Ch. 287, § 8, 58 Stat. 389 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 3317(a) (1970)). The CSC's
regulations elaborate little on the statutory language. See 5 C.F.R. § 332.404 (1976).
42. STAHL, supra note 1, at 136.
43. 5 C.F.R. § 332.406 (1976).
44. Id. § 339.101.
45. Id. § 731.201. These enumerated standards allow objection for habitual delinquency or misconduct, criminality, habitual intoxication, and reasonable doubt as to the
applicant's loyalty. Id. § 731.202.
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ployee for failure to meet these suitability standards within one year of
appointment. 46 If the candidate or employee has made an intention-ally false statement or committed other deceptive or fraudulent acts
in the examination or appointment process, the CSC may act later
than one year after appointment. 4 7 The discretion of an appointing
officer in selecting among certified applicants is limited by the requirement that an appointing officer not pass over a preference eligible entitled to a veterans' preference and select a nonpreference eli48
gible without the specific approval of the CSC.
Although an appointing officer's discretion is limited, it is still substantial. An officer need not consider a certified eligible whom he has
considered previously for three separate appointments from the same
or different certificates or for the same position. 49 In certain circumstances, eligibles other than those at the top of the register can be
certified first. When the agency is able to show that the position requires special characteristics, training, experience or skill, such as
facility in a foreign language, the CSC need only "selectively certify"
those persons on the register with those special qualifications. 50 Candidates so qualified are then certified in order of their ratings. This
procedure, which allows the Commission to certify eligibles other
than in the strict numerical order of their rating, is justified by the
argument that registers are often developed for broad and general job
categories and are not useful in filling more specialized positions. 51 Of
course, the risk of selective certification is that an agency will tailor
the specific job requirements in such a way as to eliminate all but one
or two candidates.
A certification procedure fraught with greater risk is name certification. It is available to an agency that can show that a particular individual on a register is so uniquely qualified for the position that he
should be certified to the agency by name even if he is lower on the
register than other applicants. 52 Name certification is often the result
of political pressure and is more prevalent than the nature of the
53
practice and the risk created by it would suggest.
46. Id. § 731.302(a).
47. Id. § 731.302(b).

48. 5 U.S.C.

§ 3318(b) (1970). See also 5 C.F.R. §.332.407(a) (1976).

49.
50.

5 U.S.C. § 3317(b) (1970). See also 5 C.F.R. § 332.405 (1976).
5 C.F.R. § 332.403 (1976).

51.

STAHL,,upra note 1, at 136.

52. 5 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1976).
53. For example, in 1969 over 60 percent of the persons appointed competitively to
technical and professional positions in the Office of the Director of the Manpower Administration were certified from CSC registers in response to name requests. R.
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Once an agency receives a certificate of eligibles it must use the
certificate or return it within a specified number of days. "While a
name is on a certificate to one agency, it is normally not certified to
another agency. When an agency reports a selection from a certifi54
cate, that name is removed from the register."
Certified applicants being seriously considered for appointment and
candidates already appointed are subject to suitability and qualification investigations conducted by the CSC. 55 The Commission has
come under severe criticism in some cases for its loyalty, security and
suitability decisions resulting from full field investigations into highly
56
personal areas.
Within budget constraints and Commission guidelines, an agency
has discretion concerning the number of persons who may be within
57
a given grade and whether competitive openings will be offered.
This discretion gives the agency considerable leeway in filling positions in the competitive service. It allows an agency to weigh inappropriate factors in considering a candidate, or to avoid filling a particular position because the agency does not wish to appoint individuals
presently available for inappropriate reasons, such as a citizen's previous criticism of government policy.
State and local civil service procedures do not vary substantially
from the general pattern for examination and appointment established
in the federal service. This is not surprising considering the persuasive example which the federal model has provided. Because of the
costs and difficulties of designing tests, many jurisdictions have
tended to rely upon generalized tests and upon the federal experience in test development and testing procedures.
11.

VETERANS' PREFERENCE

A. History
War veterans have traditionally received some preference in appointment to public employment. Even early in our country's history
it was customary to appoint military officers to positions as collectors
VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM III at 33-34 (draft

ed. 1972).
HARVEY, supra note 31, at 56.
55. 5 C.F.R. §§ 731.301-.302 (1976).
56. See VAUGHN, supra note 23, at 140-42.
57. 5 U.S.C. § 5107 (1970). For "supergrade" positions (GS 16, 17 and 18), however,
Congress has specified the maximum number of such positions for each agency, unless
a majority of Commissioners agree to more, but within statutory limits. Id. § 5108, as
amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).

54.
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of customs, surveyors, internal revenue officers and commissioners of
loans. 58 Beginning with proposals for a lifetime half-pay plan made
during the Revolutionary War, Congress has acted to minimize wartime compensation in favor of postponed reward. 59 After the Civil
War, Congress provided that
persons honorably discharged from the military or naval service by
reason of disability resulting from wounds or sickness incurred in the
line of duty shall be referred for appointment to civil offices provided
they be found to possess the business capacity necessary for the proper
60
discharge of the duties of such offices.
Since there was no uniform system for considering applicants for employment, however, the preference law merely had the effect each
appointing officer chose to give it. The benefit to disabled veterans
was extended under the Appropriation Bill of 1876 to all honorably
discharged veterans. When reducing their numbers, executive departments were to "retain those persons who may be equally qualified
who have been honorably discharged from the military or naval service of the United States, and the widows and orphans of deceased
61
soldiers and sailors."
At the time of the Appropration Bill of 1876, preference for veterans in state and federal government was not only of long-standing, it
was also consistent with the patronage system prevailing in public
service. Politicians used the system to gain the support of the large
groups of politically influential veterans.
In an atmosphere of indiscriminate patronage dispensation fostered by
the old spoils system preferential appointments for war veterans commended itself to legislators, particularly as it had ready acceptance by
the public at large which undoubtedly preferred war veterans in public
positions to leaving it to spoils men to exploit the filling of vacancies in
the public service. 62
Civil service reformers sought a system insulated from political patronage in which appointment and advancement would be based upon
58.

U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Veteran Preference in State Government Employment

2 (undated) [hereinafter cited as State Veteran Preference]. For a history of veteran
preferences in federal employment see U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, History of Veteran
Preference, Federal Employment, 1865-1955 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Federal Veteran Preference].
59.

Resolution of March 22, 1783, 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

207 (G. Hunt ed. 1922).
60. S.J. RES. 27, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.,. 13 Stat. 571 (1865).
61. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, ch. 287, § 3, 19 Stat. 169.
62. KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 295.
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competence. Preference for veterans would seem to be inconsistent
with a merit system, yet two forerunners in civil service reform
-New York and the federal government-both gave preference to
veterans in 1884 and 1883, respectively. 63 Apparently the reformers
believed that this compromise was necessary to gain support for the
proposed reforms and to avoid a confrontation with professionally
64
organized war veterans.
The mandatory preference for veterans in the federal service was
repeated in the Appropriation Act of 1912,65 which required the Civil
Service Commission to establish an efficiency rating system concerning promotions, demotions and dismissals. It also required that "no
honorably discharged soldier or sailor whose record . . . is rated good
shall be discharged, or dropped, or reduced in rank or salary." 6 6
The veterans' preference became more firmly entrenched at the
end of World War I when powerful veterans' organizations were
formed to seek an enlargement of preference provisions. The Census
Act of March 3, 1919,67 contained a rider that granted preference in
appointment in the classified service in Washington, D.C. to all hon68
orably discharged soldiers, sailors and marines and to their widows.
This marked the first time that a preference had been granted to
nondisabled veterans and to the widows of veterans. 69 The Act of
March 3 was amended by the Deficiency Act of July 11, 1919,70
which further extended the boundaries of the veterans' preference:
[Hlereafter in making appointments to clerical and other positions in
the Executive branch of the Government in the District of Columbia or
elsewhere preference shall be given to honorably discharged soldiers,
sailors, and marines, and widows of such and to the wives of injured
soldiers, sailors and marines who themselves are not qualified, but
whose wives are qualified to hold such positions. 71
This 1919 Act was repealed on June 18, 1929,72 but the provision
giving preference for veterans was reenacted the same day. 73 The
63.
410, §
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 7, 22 Stat. 406; Laws of New York, 1884, ch.
4.
KAPLAN, supra note 3, at 295.
Act of Aug. 23, 1912, ch. 350, 37 Stat. 360.
Id. § 4, 37 Stat. 413.
Ch. 97, 40 Stat. 1291.
Id. § 6, 40 Stat. 1293.
Federal Veteran Preference, supra note 58, at 5.
Ch. 6, 41 Stat. 35.
Id. 41 Stat. 37.
Ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21.
Id. § 3.
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1929 Act remained the basic veteran preference provision until the
74
Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 was enacted on June 27, 1944.
During the period between World War I and World War II, the
statutory preferences were augmented by executive rules and regulations which established the background for the Veterans' Preference
Act of 1944 and the rules and regulations developed thereunder.
Practices developed during the period between the wars included
granting five or ten preference points on examinations, or requiring
that the ten-point preference for disabled veterans be granted only
when the official service records established an existing serviceconnected disability; requiring an appointing officer who passed over
a veteran to select a nonveteran to file the reason with the Civil Service Commission (the appointing officer was not required to furnish
the veteran a copy of the reasons); and providing that the decision to
bypass a veteran was subject to review by the Civil Service
Commission. 75 In addition, state appointment quotas, age limits and
physical requirements could be waived. 7 6 Special rules for veterans
were -also established with respect to credit for military service resto77
ration, reopening of examinations and reinstatement.
The retention preference granted by the Act of August 23, 191278
was deferred until an efficiency rating system was established by the
Executive Order of October 24, 1921.79 A number of executive orders
interpreted the retention preference. The Executive Order of June
24, 193880 provided that no veteran should be discharged, dropped or
reduced in rank or salary "before any employee not entitled to military preference in competition with"him if his efficiency rating is less
than good but better than, or equal to that of any such nonpreference
employee."81
B.

Nature of Preference

Legislating against this background, Congress established preferences for veterans in the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944.82 The
Veterans' Preference Act, amendments to it, and regulations implementing it together form the basis for the preference in the federal
74.

Ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Federal Veteran Preference, supra note 58, at 6-9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10-12.
Ch. 350, § 4, 37 Stat. 413.
Exec. Order No. 3567, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1939).
Exec. Order No. 7915, 3 C.F.R. 339 (Comp. 1938-1943).
3 C.F.R. 349-50 (Comp. 1938-1943).
Ch. 287, 58 Stat. 387 (codified in various sections of 5, 18, & 40 U.S.C.).
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service. Every state with a merit or civil service system accords some
type of employment preference to veterans.8 3 As one commentator on
public personnel administration has noted, "most jurisdictions have
made veterans a privileged class so far as public employment is

concerned. "84
Preference for veterans may be accorded in a number of ways including preference in appointment, promotion and retention, and
may raise problems involving definition and interpretation. The nature of veterans' preference and accompanying interpretive problems
will be discussed first for federal employment and second for state
employment, followed by an evaluation of constitutional and policy
objections.
1.

Federalprovisionsfor veterans

In the federal service, a veteran is defined as a person who served
on active duty in the armed forces during a war, in a campaign or
expedition for which a campaign badge has been authorized, or during the period beginning April 28, 1952, and ending July 1, 1955, or
who, after January 31, 1955, served on active duty as defined by section 101(21) of title 38 at any time in the armed forces for a period of
more than 180 consecutive days. To be eligible for preference under
section 101 a veteran must serve in active duty other than duty for
training and be separated under honorable conditions.8 5 A disabled
veteran is an individual who has served on active duty in the armed
forces, has been separated therefrom under honorable conditions, and
has established the present existence of a service-connected disability
or is receiving compensation, disability retirement benefits or pension
because of a public statute administered by the Veterans Administration or a Military Department.8 6 Preferences are also extended to the
following: an unmarried widow or widower of a veteran; the wife or
husband of a service-connected disabled veteran who has been unable
to qualify for any appointment in the civil service; the mother of an
individual who either lost his life under honorable conditions while
serving in the armed forces or who has a service-connected permanent and total disability, provided that the mother's husband is totally
and permanently disabled, or that she is widowed, divorced, or separated and has not remarried, or that she has remarried but is
83. State Veteran Preference, supra note 58, at 1. According to the Report, 39 states
have such systems.
84. STAHL, supra note 1, at 137.

85.

5 U.S.C. § 2108(1) (1970).

86.

Id. § 2108(2).
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widowed, divorced or legally separated from her husband when the
preference is claimed.8 7 The veterans and others who are entitled to
employment preferences are called preference eligibles.
Preference eligibles who receive a passing grade on an examination
for entrance into the competitive service are entitled to additional
points above the earned rating.8 8 A disabled veteran, the unmarried
widow or widower of a veteran, and spouses and mothers to whom
preferences are extended are entitled to ten points on an examination
on which 100 points is the maximum. All other preference eligibles
are entitled to five points.89 In examinations for the competitive service in which experience is an element of qualification, a preference
eligible is entitled to credit for service in the armed forces when his
employment in a similar vocation to that for which he is presently
being examined had been previously interrupted by the service. He
is also entitled to credit for all experience relevant to the position for
which examined, including experience gained in religious, civic, welfare service and organizational activities regardless of whether he received pay for them. 90 When an agency passes over a preference eligible and selects a nonpreference eligible, it must record its reasons
for doing so and furnish a copy thereof to the preference eligible or
his representative on request. 91 The appointing officer must submit
his reasons for not selecting the preference eligible to the CSC for a
review of their sufficiency, and further action on the appointment is
withheld until the appointing officer receives the Commission's
findings. 92 In determining qualifications of a preference eligible for
examination, appointment or reinstatement in the competitive service, requirements as to age, height and weight not essential to the
performance of the duties are waived by statute, 93 and other physical
requirements must be waived by the examining agency if, after consideration of the recommendation of an accredited physician, the
examining agency determines that the preference eligible is able to
perform efficiently the duties of the position. 94 The provision restricting eligibility of a family member to appointment in the competitive
service when two or more members of a family are employed in the
87.
88.

5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1970).
5 U.S.C. § 3309 (1970).

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. § 3311.
Id. § 3318(b).
5 C.F.R. § 302.401(b) (1976).

93. 5 U.S.C. § 3312(1) (1970).
94. Id. § 3312(2).
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competitive service does not apply to a preference eligible. 95 Positions as guards, elevator operators, messengers and custodians are restricted to preference eligibles as long as such persons are available. 96
In addition, special transitional and readjustment appointments are
available which waive some of the requirements for initial appoint97
ment.
Limited preference is also afforded preference eligibles in promotion, as in the waiver of physical qualifications. 9 8 Preference eligibles
both in the classified and the excepted service are given procedural
protections and right to review of their disciplinary and removal actions by the CSC. 99
An important preference is the protection given to preference eligibles in agency reductions in force. By statute, Commission regulations concerning reductions in force shall give due effect to tenure of
employment, military preference, length of service and efficiency of
performance rating. 10 0 CSC regulations implementing this statute
make specific provision for preference eligibles in agency determinations of retention standings.' 0 ' Special tenure subgroups are established for preference eligibles giving them a retention advantage over
nonpreference eligibles who would otherwise fall within the same
tenure group.10 2 Other advantages are conferred in establishing an
efficiency or performance rating for preference eligibles. 10 3 In computing length of service for order of retention, a veteran is entitled to
credit for the length of time in active service in the armed forces
during a war or in a campaign or expedition for which a campaign
10 4
badge has been authorized.
Preference eligibles are given additional priority in reappointment.
An agency may reappoint a former employee of the executive branch
of the federal government who is a preference eligible over non95. Id. § 3319.
96. Id. § 3310.
97. 5 C.F.R. §§ 307.101-.106 (1976).
98. 5 U.S.C. § 3363 (1970).
99. Id. §§ 7512, 7701. Procedural protections are also afforded nonveterans, id.
§ 7501, but there is no corresponding right to appeal.
100. Id. § 3502(a).
101. 5 C.F.R. § 351.501 (1976).
102. Id. § 351.501(e).
103. 5 U.S.C. § 3502(b) (1970). A preference eligible with a "good" or "satisfactory"
rating is retained over a nonpreference eligible with either rating. One whose rating is
lower than "good" is retained over a nonpreference eligible with an equal or lower
rating. Id.
104. Id. §§ 3502(a)(A), (B). But such service may not be used to fulfill the service
requirements for appointment to a career position. Cunningham v. United States, 181 F.
Supp. 269 (Ct. CL.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960).
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preference eligibles on an agency's reemployment list. 10 5 A preference eligible entitled to a ten-point preference on a competitive examination may be hired initially over an individual on an agency's
reemployment priority list.106
Special provision is also made for the restoration of employees
called on active duty or training duty to their civil service
positions. 10 7 An employee entitled to restoration must be restored
within 30 days after the application for restoration has been
received,108 and during the employee's absence, agency action with
respect to the employee is regulated. For example, an agency shall
consider each employee absent on military duty for all promotions for
which the employee would be considered if not absent, and the effective date of a promotion made on such consideration is the date the
promotion would have been made were the employee not absent.' 0 9
An employee on military duty may not be demoted during the
absence."10 Military service may also be credited towards civil service
retirement."'
2.

Federal provisionsfor retired military personnel

In addition to the preferences for veterans, civil service law provides incentives for retired military personnel to seek a second career
in the federal civil service. Retired members of the armed forces are
entitled to the appointment preferences granted to preference eligibles. The retention preference, however, is available to a retired
member of the uniformed services only if. his retirement was caused
by injury or disease received in the line of duty from armed conflict,
or was caused by an instrumentality of war and was incurred in the
line of duty during a period of war; his service was for less than 20
years of full-time active service, not including periods of active duty
for training; or he was employed in a position subject to the retention
preference for more than 30 consecutive days beginning on November

30, 1964.112
Retired members of the armed forces are especially restricted in
appointment to a position in the civil service in or under the Department of Defense for a period of 180 days immediately following
105.
106.

5 C.F.R. §§ 302.402, 330.201(c) (1976).
Id. § 330.201(a)(1).

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

5 U.S.C. § 3551 (1970). See 5 C.F.R. §§ 353.101-.501 (1976).
5 C.F.R. § 353.302(a) (1976).
Id. § 353.201(a).
Id. § 353.201(c).
5 U.S.C. §§ 8332(c)-(g) (1970).
Id. § 3501(a)(3).
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retirement. 113 The statute is quite specific in attempting to reduce
the influx of retired military officers into civilian positions in the Defense Department. The authorization of approval for appointment of
the individual must be accompanied by a statement which shows that
action was taken to ensure that full consideration was given to eligible
career employees; that when selection is not by certification from a
civil service register, the vacancy has been publicized to give interested candidates an opportunity to apply; that the position's qualification requirements have not been written so as to give advantage
to the retired member; and that the position has not been held open
pending the member's retirement. 114
In addition to veteran preferences, certain economic incentives
exist to attract retired members to civil service positions. Prior to
1964, retired commissioned officers were barred from federal employment if the combined income of military retirement and the civil
service position was more than $10,000 per year. 1 15 The Dual Compensation Act 1 6 opened the civil service to retired military personnel
by providing that a retired officer could receive full pay for a civil
service position plus retirement pay reduced to an annual rate equal
1 7
to the first $2,000 of retirement pay and one-half of the remainder.'
It is difficult to determine the exact impact of the Dual Compensation Act upon the federal civil service. In a 1966 communication to
the House Civil Service and Post Office Committee, President Johnson reported on the operations of the executive branch under the
Act. President Johnson reported that in the ten-month period covered by the study, 7,458 retired members of the uniformed services
were hired; of these 1,631 were retired officers. According to the
report, "Itlhere was considerable concentration of appointments in
the general administrative, clerical, and office service occupational
group, where there were 863 appointments reported. "118 The De113.

A retired member may be appointed during the period only with the authoriza-

tion of the Secretary of Defense or his designee and approval of the CSC if the position
is in the competitive service, if a state of national emergency exists, or if the rate of pay
of the position for which the retired serviceman has applied has been increased under
Presidential authority. Id. § 3326(b).
114. Id. § 3326(c).
115. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 212, 47 Stat. 406, as amended, Act of Aug. 4,
1955, ch. 561, § 2, 69 Stat. 498. An exception was made for those retired because of a
combat-incurred disability.
116. Act of Aug. 19, 1964, 78 Stat. 484.
117. Id. § 201(a). Reserve officers had been specifically authorized to hold dual employment by a prior enactment. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, ch. 1041, § 29(c), 70A Stat. 632
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5534 (1970)).
118. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a report on
the operations of the executive branch under Title II of the Dual Compensation Act,

19761

PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

fense Department accounted for 4,478 of the hirings. Present estimates of the number of retired military personnel in civil service positions vary between 100,000 and 200,000.119 Despite its benefits, the
hiring of retired military personnel is certain to further imbue the
defense establishment with the perspectives of career officers and
may act to limit hiring and promotion opportunities for other groups
such as Vietnam-era veterans.
3.

State provisionsfor veterans
As with federal employment, preferences for veterans are a substantial and comprehensive aspect of state employment; preferences
are generally similar to those provided for federal employment. Most
states augment competitive civil service examination scores of veterans by adding preference points, thus giving veterans higher rankings on lists of eligibles. A number of states give additional prefer1 20
ence points to disabled veterans.
A summary prepared by the Veterans Services Staff of the CSC on
the nature of veterans' preference in the states shows that considerable variation exists as to the breadth of the appointment preference.
For example, Texas requires all state agencies to hire forty percent
veterans while other states limit the preferences to a few agencies or
a single agency.' 21 The summary also reveals several significant differences in the application of the preference. Some states do not require a veteran to earn a passing score on an appointment examination before preference points are granted. Others grant preference
points by giving the veteran a percentage of the score actually
obtained 12 2 rather than an established number of points.

C. Constitutionalityof Preference
Constitutional attacks upon veterans' preference have taken a
number of forms, including allegations that such provisions violate
due process and establish a privileged class. The basis of the principal
challenges is the argument that preferences deny equal protection of
the law by establishing classifications and distinctions between classes
of persons not related to the permissible purpose of a statute.
House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, Feb. 23, 1966, at 13, quoted in R.
VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

III

at 88 (draft

ed. 1972).

119. R.

VAUGHN, THE SPOILED SYSTEM: A CALL FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM III

88 (draft ed. 1972).
120. State Veteran Preference, supra note 58, at 1.
121. Id. at table & n.10.
122. Id.

at

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSIHT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:659

Critics of preferences for veterans have argued that such preferences reduce job opportunities for women. A federal court recently
struck down the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute as violative of women's right to equal protection of the law. 123 The Massachusetts statute required that veterans receiving a passing score on
a civil service examination be given an absolute preference in appointment over non-veterans. The court noted that the effect of this
statutory scheme was to significantly limit employment opportunities
for women. While a state might appropriately reward military service
through some type of job preference, the state could not, considering
the effect of the statute on women, grant an absolute and permanent
preference to veterans. The court intimated that a less drastic prefer' 12 4
ence statute "might escape constitutional rejection."
Appointment preferences granted to a veteran are valid if the veteran is otherwise qualified, 125 but when granted to a veteran who has
not received a passing score on a competitive examination they have
been found to be unconstitutional. 12 6 Although courts seem willing to
accept the judgment of the legislature in granting preference to veterans, they have demonstrated an unwillingness to acquiesce in that
judgment when the special privilege seems unlikely to insure the
competence of public employees. The distinction simply becomes less
rational when a greater likelihood exists that the quality of the civil
service will suffer. The distinction upon which the grant is made must
be related to the privilege granted.
By similar reasoning, the granting of promotion preferences has
been found improper by some courts. Courts have held that once the
employee has entered public service, additional advancement should
be based upon ability and capacity demonstrated in the performance
of public duties. Preference granted without regard to fitness for a
position is unconstitutional. 127 Other courts, however, have found the
123. Anthony v. Commonwealth, 44 U.S.L.W. 2495 (D. Mass. Mar. 29, 1976).
124. Id. at 2496.
125. People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 105 N.E. 1 (1914) (passing grade on
service examination required by statute); Shaw v. City Council of Marshalltown, 131
Iowa 128, 104 N.W. 1121 (1925) (statute required inquiry into person's ability to perform civil service duties). See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R. 494 (1946).
126. Brown v. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 N.E. 1005 (1896) (veterans exempted from
examination by previous statute; new statute made appointment compulsory if applicant
secured three affidavits); In re Keymer, 148 N.Y. 219, 42 N.E. 667 (1896) (statute exempting non-Civil War veterans from competitive civil service examination violated
state constitution); Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701
(1938) (statute granting 15% credit in score on examination in advance of taking it and
without regard to whether passing grade otherwise achieved held unconstitutional).
127. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951) (stat-
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continuation of preference in promotion to be proper. 128
Retention preferences based in part upon job performance 12 9 and
procedural protection not available to other employees have been sustained against constitutional attack. The District of Columbia Circuit,
for example, sustained the refusal of a district judge to convene a
three-judge court on the ground that an allegation by dismissed nonveteran employees that the Veterans' Preference Act discriminated
against them in the violation of their constitutional rights failed to raise
a substantial constitutional question. In doing so, the court noted:
Veterans' preference in federal employment has been an established
policy of Congress for many years. Encouragement and reward of military service are its rational basis. If it is unwise and costly, this does not
make it unconstitutional. The Supreme Court and other courts have enforced it, and have done so without suggesting any possible constitutional difficulty. 130
Other aspects of veterans' preference provisions have been challenged as denying equal protection. In Russell v. Hodges' 3 1 a veteran
who had served in time of peace claimed that the granting of procedural protections to war veterans but not to peacetime veterans
denied the latter equal protection on the ground that the disruption
to life and career of both were substantially equal. In rejecting the
argument, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded:
While the disruption factor may be equally great with respect to persons who had served in the armed forces in peacetime, the desire to
confer a reward is not of the same order of magnitude, and this alone is
It can,
a sufficient basis for conferring so modest an added benefit ....
veterans]
a
better
[distinction
among
of course, be argued that . . .

would be between those who were in combat duty and all others ....
But apart from the fact that the legislature could rationally have drawn
the line at those who risked their lives in combat or might have been
called upon to do so, the task of determining just what constitutes subjection to combat could well have been deemed too difficult for practical
ute granting 10-point bonus to veterans on examination for promotions found unconstitutional).
128. McNamara v. Director of Civil Serv., 330 Mass. 22, 110 N.E.2d 840 (1953)
(two-point preference was sustained, and Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368

Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951), was not followed); State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 90 A,2d 862 (1952) (five- and 10-point preferences sustained).
129. White v. Gates, 253 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 973 (1958)
(challenge by nonveterans of federal preference statute for retention presented no substantial constitutional question).
130. 253 F.2d at 869, citing Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323 (1948) and Reynolds v.
Lovett, 201 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, Wilson v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 926
(1953).
131. 470 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1972).
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administration and the legislature could properly opt for the much
easier task of determining dates of service. 132
Similarly, granting preferences to those who performed military
service while denying them to those who as conscientious objectors
performed alternative service would seem to be a constitutional exercise of legislative powers, and it is one which has been upheld by the
Supreme Court. In Johnson v. Robison, 1 33 the Court sustained a denial of educational benefits under the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1966
to a conscientious objector who had satisfactorily completed two years
of alternative civilian service. It pointed out that the disruption
caused by military service differed from that caused by alternative
service, both quantitatively and qualitatively and that the educational
benefits available to draftees might tend to make them more willing
to serve as soldiers. On the other hand, since conscientious objectors
base their refusal to serve on deeply-rooted religious beliefs, the
Court reasoned that subsequent educational benefits would be unlikely to increase their willingness to serve. Because the desire to
obtain soldiers was a legitimate government purpose, the Court concluded that offering a benefit designed to further that goal had a ra1 34
tional basis, and did not involve invidious discrimination.
Some state statutes which have limited the availability of the veterans' preference, however, have been struck down. Residency requirements have proved to be particularly vulnerable. One federal
district court struck down a statute imposing requirements relating to
the length of time that a veteran need be a domiciliary or resident of
a state before becoming eligible for the preference. 1 35 The court
found such a requirement violative of the equal protection clause.
Another federal court applied the compelling state interest test to a
similar statute, believing that the durational residency requirement
impinged upon the fundamental right to interstate travel. 13 6 None of
the reasons advanced by the state were found to satisfy this

standard. 1 3 7 One of the courts acknowledged the state's valid interest
132. Id. at 218 (citations omitted).
133. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
134. Id. at 378-79, 382-83, 389.
135. See Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102 (D. Mass. 1971) (statute required
domicile in state for six months prior to entry into wartime service or residence for five
consecutive years prior to claiming preference; rational basis test applied).
136. Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971). Minnesota's five-year
durational residency statute was found to affect interstate travel in that Minnesota residents who chose to travel or move within that period were penalized. Id. at 632-33.
137. Rejected state justifications included the desirability of limiting the preference
to those who had contributed substantially to the tax base, the interest in meeting a
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in the personal characteristics which military service develops, but
pointed out that a new resident was as likely to have these characteristics as one who fulfilled the durational residency requirement.1'8
D.

Evaluation of Veterans' Preference

Even if veterans' preference provisions are constitutional, they may
be unwise or inappropriate. Attacks upon preferences for veterans
have centered upon the inconsistency of such preferences with civil
service reform and the merit concept and upon the unfairness of such
preferences to other potential public employees, particularly
women.' 39 Based upon the assumption that veterans are likely to use
preferences to obtain higher ranking and higher paying positions, it
has been argued that veterans tend to predominate in the highest
grades, reducing appointment and promotional opportunities for
others. The concentration of veterans in high-ranking policy positions
has concerned some as improperly imbuing the civil service with a
military perspective and creating a privileged class who wield inordinate political and practical influence.140 If the best qualified are not
appointed, it has been argued, the efficiency of the civil service will
suffer even if the veteran ultimately appointed through preference is
minimally qualified. Furthermore, veterans' preference may effectively exclude non-veterans from consideration when applicants are
closely clustered.
Justifications for veterans' preferences have tended to focus on the
purposes underlying the granting of preferences. These purposes include the government's desire to aid veterans in relocation because of
disruptive effects of military service on civilian life,' 4' to reward veterans for the service which they have performed and by so doing to
encourage patriotism, 14 2 and to utilize in public service the valuable
qualities and experiences possessed by those who have been in military service.143
state's selective service quota and the more restrictive durational residency requirements in other states. Id. at 633-34.
138. See Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102, 106 (D. Mass. 1971).
139. See notes 123-38 & accompanying text supra.
140. Comment, Titles of Nobility and the PreferentialTreatment of Federally Empoloyed Military Veterans, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1169, 1185-88 (1973) (suggesting military
preferences violate constitutional provision prohibiting grant of title of nobility).
141. Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1948).
142. State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862,
865 (1952); Valentine v. McDonald, 371 Mich. 138, 141, 123 N.W.2d 227, 230 (1963);
Bateman v. Marsh, 188 Misc. 189, 195-98, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678, 683-85 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 271
App. Div. 813, 66 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 849, 72 N.E.2d 30 (1947).
143. Stevens v. Campbell, 332 F. Supp. 102, 106 (D. Mass. 1971); Yates v. Rezeau,
62 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 1952).
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Of these purposes only one relates directly to an interest in the
quality of public service; the others stress public employment as an
aid or reward. A purpose which relates preference to the quality of
public service would seem to be more consistent with civil service
reform and the concept of merit than one relating to aid or reward.
Aid or reward is the basic underlying purpose of veterans' preference provisions. The description of the Veterans' Preference Act of
1944 by the House Committee on Civil Service emphasizes this purpose:
It has been the policy of the United States Government since the beginning of the Republic to extend certain benefits to those who have
risked their lives in the armed services during wartime. Since shortly
after the Civil War, the Congress has provided in various statutes for
different forms of preference in governmental employment to war veterans. These statutes have usually been in broad, general terms, and
have been applied under Executive orders and regulations promulgated
by the President. 144
Moreover, the form of veterans' preference provisions further suggests that such preference is an aid or reward for past services. These
provisions provide preferences not only for the veteran but also for
widows and widowers and in certain circumstances for spouses and
mothers. The extension of these preferences would appear justifiable
only as rewards to those who were, along with the veteran, adversely
affected by military service.
If the principal justification for veterans' preference rests upon
theories of aid and reward, as a matter of policy, how should such
preferences be evaluated in a civil service system? As discussed earlier 14 5 the purposes of civil service reform and the concept of merit
must themselves be evaluated. Among the principal purposes of such
reform were insuring both a minimum level of competency in public
employment and the fair and just administration of the laws. Merit
was viewed as a means of accomplishing these two purposes by basing
appointment and advancement upon the ability to perform a job
rather than upon political service or patronage. Merit need not be
identified with any single method of determining competence. Competence itself is a concept of considerable flexibility which must be
evaluated both against the tasks to be performed in a particular job
and the goals to be furthered by public employment. Viewed in this
way, it is not clear that a preference for veterans who otherwise meet
144.
145.

H.R. REP. No. 1289, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944).
See notes 1-6 & accompanying text supra.
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minimum standards of competence is inappropriate. An examination
is required of the effect of those preferences upon competing policies,
such as equal employment opportunity for women or a desire for a
more representative bureaucracy.
One of the concerns about veterans' preferences has been that they
grant undue power to a particular group by favoring it in the administration of public programs. It is difficult to assess the extent to
which the perspectives or attitudes of veterans would adversely affect
the fair administration of the laws. Whether veterans share a set of
attitudes likely to lead to a markedly different administration of the
laws is conjectural, particularly when one considers the variety of
groups, interests and attitudes represented by veterans. For retired
military personnel who have chosen to serve one career in the military, the likelihood of the development of a special set of attitudes or
perspectives is increased. Moreover, these attitudes are ones which
may attach considerable loyalty to military institutions. The effect of a
large number of such individuals in civilian civil service positions
poses a greater risk for a markedly different administration of programs particularly when those programs affect military departments.
Given the purposes underlying veterans' preferences and the possible conflicts with the purposes of the civil service system, veterans'
preference might appropriately be limited in one or more of the following ways. First, veterans' preference must be based upon a determination of minimum competency. If reward and aid are the principal justifications for preference, the scope of the preferences should
be reduced to the narrowest extent consistent with those purposes.
Preferences might be given only to veterans who serve in combat or
to those who serve in a time of hostilities. As the discussion has suggested, such a limitation on preferences would be constitutionally
permissible. Since preferences are given to reduce the dislocations
sustained by veterans, a requirement might logically be imposed that
the preference be exercised within a limited time after separation
from the service or be lost.1 4 6 Under this theory, once the preference
had been used to secure appointment, further reliance on the preference for promotion, retention, reinstatement or subsequent appointment would be prohibited.
None of the purposes for preference apply to retired military personnel. Their careers have not been interrupted, for indeed they
have chosen a career of military service. As career personnel they
have been rewarded by pay, benefits and pensions. Civil service jobs
146.

STAHL, supra note 1, at

141.
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should not be used as a deferred incentive for selecting a military
career. Therefore, appointment preferences should be limited in a
manner consistent with present restrictions placed upon retention
preferences for retired military personnel. The effect of the Dual
Compensation Act both upon the military and the civil service should
be evaluated carefully and its repeal considered, as should be the
removal of any additional economic incentives for retired military
personnel to seek employment in the federal civil service.
Because it has been traditionally granted, veterans' preference
poses a significant problem for civil service law. How that problem is
resolved will tell us as much about the nature of the civil service as it
will about veterans' preference.
III. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
Unlike veterans, minorities and women traditionally have not fared
well in public employment. Beginning with their experience with
Postmaster General Gideon, who in 1802 expressed doubt that blacks
were capable of serving as public servants, 147 blacks quickly became
aware that their rights as employees of the federal government were
conditioned upon their color. Congress passed a law in 1810 forbidding anyone "other than a free white person [to] be employed in
conveying the mail."' 148 The first black, a first-grade clerk in the Department of Treasury, was not appointed to the federal bureacracy
until 1867.149
Initial progress made between the Civil War and 1900 was reversed in the early 1900's. "Blacks employed in the federal service
faced the reactionary practices of the Taft and Wilson administrations
as they and other minorities discovered that the merit system was
used primarily to judge white merit."' 50 The techniques of reduction
in force and reorganization had been highly developed by the time of
the Wilson administration and were used to downgrade and dismiss
black employees. One method involved transferring black clerks from
147.
[I oppose] everything which tends to increase [the blacks'] knowledge of
natural rights, or men and things, or that affords them an opportunity of associating,
acquiring and communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain or line of
intelligence-[especially blacks' learning] that a man's rights do not depend on his
color.
M. Brewer, Behind the Promises: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Federal Government I-I (draft report 1972) (published by Public Interest Research Group, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Brewer], quoting S. KRISLOV, THE NEGRO IN FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT 8 (1967).
148. Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 4, 2 Stat. 594.
149. Brewer, supra note 147, at I-I.
150. Id.
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a central post office to branch offices that postal authorities had previously decided to abolish. The jobs of the transferred blacks ended
automatically upon the closing of the branches. 15 1
By the time of the Coolidge administration, "Negro Federal Government workers expected nothing from Mr. Coolidge and they were
not disappointed."1 52 Not until President Roosevelt's New Deal was
race no longer considered a legitimate basis for making personnel
53
decisions. 1
Neither have women fared well in federal employment. The principle that women should receive equal pay for equal work was not
accepted as federal personnel policy until 1923.154 Even after passage of the Classification Act, women's wages were lower than men's
wages; women were hired, as were minorities, for low-grade, low55
skilled jobs. 1
Recent legislative and judicial actions to enforce equal employment
opportunity have challenged the traditional reliance of public em-"
ployers upon competitive examinations. In 1972 the Equal Employment Opportunity Act' 5 6 amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964157 to
extend the latter's coverage to state and local governments 58 and
public and private educational institutions. 5 9 A substantial amount of
regulation and litigation arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has
involved the standards for hiring, firing, and promotion of public employees.
Guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) 60 require that tests which have a substantially adverse impact on minority applicants must be job related. 61' Commission
guidelines in effect presume that a test which has a substantially adverse impact on minority applicants is discriminatory unless it can be
shown to be job related. After initial conflict in the courts,' 62 the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1-2.
Id., quoting A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEw FREEDOM 244 (1956).
Id. at 1-2.
Classification Act of Mar. 4, 1923, ch. 265, 42 Stat. 1488.
Brewer, supra note 147, at 1-2.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (Supp. IV, 1974).
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Id. § 200e-1.
The EEOC was established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-4 (1970).
161. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974). See generally id. §§ 1607.1-.14.
162. Compare Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355
(D. Mass. 1969); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 269 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968); and
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968), with United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 316 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in
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standards for employment tests were established by the United States
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Company. 1 63 For its internal promotion the Duke Power Company had used the Wonderlic
Personnel Test, which purported to measure general intelligence, and
the Binet Mechanical Aptitude Test. Evidence showed that employees who failed to take the tests continued to perform satisfactorily
and make progress within the departments for which the test criteria
were established. 16 4 The Court held that absent a showing that a testing procedure which operates to exclude blacks is related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. 165 The Court cautioned that the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act did not preclude the use of tests
or measuring procedures, but that Congress had forbidden giving
them controlling force in the absence of a showing that they can accu66
rately predict one's future job performance. 1
When considering the 1972 amendments to title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, Congress recognized that standardized civil service tests
may have a substantial adverse effect upon minorities:
Civil Service selection and promotion requirements are replete with artificial selection and promotion requirements that place a premium on
"paper" credentials which frequently prove of questionable value as a
means of predicting actual job performance. The problem is further aggravated by the [CSC's] use of general ability tests which are not aimed
at any direct relationship to specific jobs. The inevitable consequence of
this, as demonstrated by similar practices in the private sector, and,
found unlawful by the Supreme Court, is that classes of persons who are
culturally or educationally
disadvantaged are subject to a heavier burden
167
in seeking employment.
part, 451 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); and Broussard v.
Schlumberger Well Servs., 315 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Tex. 1970). In Jacksonville Terminal,
the district court intimated that to support an allegation that tests administered by employers discriminated on the basis of race, proof must be adduced by the complaining
party that the test was designed, created, implemented or administered with the intent
to discriminate. 316 F. Supp. at 583. On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit noted a
statistically verifed de facto pattern of racial discrimination, and reversed the district
court because the employer had not adequately sustained its burden of showing that the
test had "a manifest relationship to the employment in question." 451 F.2d at 456-57.
This approach was in accord with that followed in Arrington, in which the court made it
clear that once a de facto pattern of racial classification adversely affecting minority
groups had been statistically shown, intent to discriminate was not relevant; the employer must demonstrate the correlation between the test scores and the ability to perform a particular job. 306 F. Supp. at 1358.

163.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 431-32 & n.7.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 436.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971).
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Following the decision in Griggs and the extension of title VII to
state and local governments, a number of challenges were made to
civil service tests on both constitutional and statutory grounds. Among
the testing practices successfully challenged have been the requirement that teachers achieve a minimum score on the National
Teachers Examination for Retention in the School System 168 or the
Graduate Record Examination for hiring teachers; 169 written examinations for supervisory positions within a school system; 1 70 state civil
service examinations for correction officers; 1 71 written examinations
for state correction officers' appointment to or promotion in a police
3
department; 17 2 and written examinations for fire fighters.17
Any written test used in public employment that has a substantial
adverse effect upon minority applicants or employees must be job
related to be valid. 17 4 Under title VII, the burden is upon the applicant or employee to show that the test has a racially disproportionate impact. This may be done by showing, for example, that a substantially greater percentage of a racial group fails the test than do
whites. If comparative data is not maintained by race, a random sample of minority group members and whites taking the tests may be

used to establish the disproportionate impact. 175 Courts have found
168. Walston v. County School Bd., 492 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1974) (score of 500);
Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School Dist., 329 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Miss.
1971), aff'd, 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1972) (score of 1000).
169. Armstead v. Starkville Municipal Separate School Dist., 325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D.

Miss. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972).
170. Chance v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
171. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't. of Correctional Servs., 374 F. Supp. 1361
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
172. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2040
(1976); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973);
Smith v. East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 520 F.2d 492 (6th Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 778 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 991 (1975).
173. NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part,
remanded in part, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp.
721 (D. Minn. 1972).
174. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1974) (minimum standards for validation approved by
EEOC). See generally Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test
Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 505 (1973).

175. The sample need only be large enough to be significant. Douglas v. Hampton,
512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Armstead v. Starkville Municpal Separate School Dist.,
325 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Miss. 1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1972).
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tests to have a racially disparate impact when a substantially larger
6
percentage of blacks failed than did whites.17
Recently, the Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis1 7 7 that
the standards of title VII were not applicable in determining whether
constitutional requirements of due process had been met. Disproportionate impact, sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under title VII, "is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution."'' . 8 According to the Court, the constitutional standard
required proof of a discriminatory purpose. Discriminatory purpose
could be "inferred from the totality of relevant facts including the fact
179
• . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than another."'
Although the test in Davis had a disparate impact on minorities, discriminatory purpose was lacking because the District of Columbia
police department had affirmatively and systematically recruited black
officers, and since 1969 approximately 44 percent of new police recruits had been black.' 8 0 The Court's opinion left untouched the
more rigorous standard established by title VII.
The exact difference between the two standards is not precisely
clear. Since the opinion of the Court provides that discriminatory
purpose may be inferred from the totality of the facts, the character
of government acts and not the motivations of individual government
officials may be most important. Of necessity, plaintiff's proof often
must rely on objective demonstrations of purpose. Therefore, "[t]he
line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not
nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court's opinion might assume. ' 18 1 Still unclear is how much beyond
disparate impact a plaintiff must show to establish a prima facie case,
and whether subjective good faith will provide a defense.
176. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (white pass rate ranged
from 57.8% to 60.2%, black pass rate from 11.5% to 12.4%); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc.
v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
991 (1975) (white pass rate 3 times greater than for blacks and Puerto Ricans); Castro

v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (25% pass rate for blacks and 10% for Spanish
surnamed persons compared to 65% for all others); United States v. Chicago, 385 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (failure rate for blacks and Hispanics twice that for whites);
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (1.82 times as many whites passed as
blacks).
177. 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976).
178. Id. at 2049.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 2045.
181. Id. at 2054 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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If a prima facie case is made demonstrating that a test discriminates
against minorities under constitutional or title VII standards, the bur-

den is upon the public employer to validate the test as job related.
Three techniques for validating testing procedures have been recognized by the courts and the EEOC. Empirical validity can be proven
by first identifying criteria that indicate successful job performance

and then showing a correlation between test scores and those
criteria. 182 Construct validity requires that an examination be structured to ascertain the degree to which applicants possess identifiable
characteristics that are important to successful job performance.1' 3
Content validity requires that the content of the test closely approximate the job task to be performed. 184 Although some courts have
adopted less stringent guidelines for test validation,'8 5 these three
techniques have been overwhelmingly approved.
The application of validation standards is illustrated by a challenge
to the Federal Service Entrance Examination (FSEE). The FSEE was
the primary avenue of entry into managerial and professional positions in the federal civil service. The test was challenged as discriminatory by eight black college graduates who were recruited by
the Chicago Regional Office of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development for participation in HUD's Urban Intern Program.
Three of the individuals hired as temporary employees were discharged when they could not be hired permanently because they
failed to obtain a satisfactory score on the FSEE. The remaining five
were ineligible for employment at higher ratings because they also
6
failed to obtain satisfactory scores. 18
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4 (1974). See, e.g., Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Vulcan Soc'y v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 360 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in

part, remanded in part, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).
183. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1974). See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport
Civil Ser,. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333, 1337-38 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975). Construct validity has been criticized strongly and held applicable only in limited circumstances. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
184. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1974) (incorporating Standards for Educational and
Psychological Tests and Manuals published by American Psychological Association).
See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975).
185. Despite endorsement of the EEOC standards by the Supreme Court in Griggs,
some courts have attempted to formulate other standards for test validation. See, e.g.,
Colbert v. H-K Corp., 4 CCH EMPLOY. PAc. DEC. 5982 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (expert testimony showing relationship of test results to job performance adequate to overcome
discriminatory impact). But see United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th
Cir. 1973), rev'g 50 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (the "value [of EEOC guidelines] is
such that ... they should be followed absent a showing that some cogent reason exists
for noncompliance.").
186. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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After finding that the FSEE had a racially disparate influence, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that the test had
not been properly validated; "the courts that have expressed a view
on the relative merits of [validation] techniques have uniformly manifested a preference for proof of empirical validity." 187 Despite inten8 8 It
sive effort, the CSC had failed to validate the test empirically.'
did not attempt to validate the test by the content validity technique
and the court noted that
[as] a matter of logic, it is impossible to show that a test used in filling
over 200 diverse jobs has content validity. . . . It is likely that such a
showing could be made only in regard to simple,
narrowly-defined jobs;
89
perhaps the best example is stenographic jobs. 1
The Commission then attempted to show that the test was job related
through construct validity. The court of appeals approved the EEOC
regulations which accepted construct validity only when proof of empirical validity is not feasible and remanded the matter to the EEOC
for a determination on the issue of feasibility. In effect, the court
seems to have rejected the CSC's contentions that the three techniques outlined could not feasibly be applied to the FSEE and that
only a rational relationship between the test and the class of abilities
needed to perform the jobs need be shown. The CSC has now replaced the FSEE with the PACE examination which it believes to be
more closely related to the performance skills necessary in managerial
and professional positions.
The court noted in Douglas v. Hampton19" that the testing
guidelines contained in EEOC regulations have been cited with approval by the Supreme Court, 191 followed by courts dealing with issues of validation' 9 2 and recognized as controlling in at least one
circuit.' -9 3 In assessing the validity of a test, EEOC regulations require that the relationship between the test and at least one relevant
criterion must be statistically significant.' 94 The relationship between
187. Id. at 985.
188. Id. & n.68.
189. Id. at 985 n.71.
190. 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
191. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
192. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct.
2040 (1976); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
193. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 913 (5th Cir. 1973).
194. "This ordinarily means that the relationships should be sufficiently high as to
have a probability no more than 1 to 20 to have occurred by chance." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)(i) (1974).
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the test and the criterion should also have practical significance. 195
The practical significance relationship is affected by several factors. As
more applicants are hired for or placed on the job, the correlation
between test and criterion for success must increase for the relationship to be meaningful. 196 Similarly, as more applicants who are not
selected on the basis of the test become satisfactorily employed, the
correlation must increase for the test to be useful. 197 Finally, a decreasing economic and human risk in hiring an unqualified applicant
relative to the risk in rejecting a qualified applicant requires a greater
8
correlation between test and criterion. 19
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis' 99 suggests that less rigorous standards for validating employment tests may
be acceptable. In Davis, the Court assumed that a test designed to
measure the verbal and reading ability of police recruits had been
properly validated under both constitutional and title VII
standards. 20 0 According to the Court, the district court had before it
sufficient evidence to validate the test, including a study showing that
performance on the test was significantly related to the ability of recruits to learn and comprehend material taught at the recruit
school. 20 ' The Court concluded that training program validation was
sufficient and that further correlation to job performance was not
required.202
The extent to which the opinion alters the EEOC guidelines and
judicial interpretation of the validation requirement is not clear. Justice Brennan's dissent states that the Court's dictum is "at odds with
EEOC regulations." 20 3 Justice Stevens, while concurring in the
Court's conclusion that no validation beyond performance in the training program was required, questioned whether the standards of title
VII could simply be transplanted to the case at hand. 20 4 Moreover,
substantial modification in the training program and the greater expertise of federal judges regarding the qualifications of law enforce195.

Id. § 1607.5(c)(2).

196. A relatively low relationship may prove useful when proportionately fewer jobs
are available. See id. § 1607.5(c)(2)(i).
197. A relatively low relationship may prove useful when proportionately few applicants prove satisfactory. See id. § 1607.5(c)(2)(ii).
198. A relatively low relationship may prove useful when the formal risks are relatively high. See id. § 1607.5(c)(2)(iii).
199. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
200. See id. at 2052.
201. Id. at 2052-53.
202. Id. at 2053.
203. Id. at 2058 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
204, Id. at 2055 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ment officers are both factors that may have inclined the Court to use
a less rigorous standard for validation of this particular test.
Although the decision approves the use of a test to predict performance in a training program without further correlation to job performance, job relatedness is still required. Whether the opinion signifies that test validation requires only a rational relationship between
an employment test and job performance, or that more rigorous standards may be applied, is not clear.
Regardless of the standard applied, many civil service examinations
used for appointment and for promotion are of doubtful validity.
Since written examinations play a significant role in the administration of a merit system, these decisions will influence not only the
practice but also the rationale of civil service provisions. 205
Other restrictions placed upon employment qualifications by the
standards of title VII also may significantly affect the hiring and
promotion practices of public employers. Among these are restrictions
imposing educational requirements, requirements of work experience
and reliance upon police records.
Minimal educational requirements are often imposed for appointment to civil service positions. Educational qualifications in addition
to or in substitution for testing requirements are a common civil service requirement. 06 Often an applicant who lacks the required education must score a substantially higher test score to remain eligible
for appointment. Such educational requirements may have an adverse
effect on minority groups. A much smaller percentage of blacks and
Spanish surnamed persons than whites completes high school and the
disparity is greater for completion of college or professional school. If
an educational requirement has a disparate effect upon racial groups,
the requirement must be shown to be job related.
A requirement for a high school diploma has been found to be
discriminatory by the Supreme Court but only in the context of past
racial discrimination.207 In Griggs,208 the company historically had
hired both blacks and whites for the labor department in its plant.
Prior to the mid-1950's, however, whites without high school educations who had not passed standardized tests could transfer out of the
department to higher ranking positions; blacks could not. In the
205. For suggestions on how to revise the civil service requirements see ABBATIELLO, ALTERNATIVES TO WRITTEN TESTS 1-4 (1974) (published by National Civil
Service League).
206. See notes 33-35 & accompanying text supra.
207. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

208. Id.
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mid-1950's the company required both blacks and whites to have a
high school diploma before they were permitted to transfer out of the
labor department. The effect of the requirement was to lock in blacks
hired before the new standard had developed. In this situation, the
Supreme Court held that the requirement must be shown to be "demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance." The Court
noted that while certificates, diplomas and degrees are useful measures of accomplishment, Congress has mandated that they are not to
be sole criteria for predicting effective job performance.20 9
When the effect of a high school diploma requirement is not to lock
in victims of previous discrimination, one court has found such a re210
quirement to be a lawful and useful device for personnel selection.
Based upon the language in Griggs, however, it seems clear that as a
tool of initial selection, an educational requirement which has a disparate effect upon a racial group must be shown to be job related. In
United States v. Georgia Power Co.,211 the court specifically found
that a high school diploma requirement which has a disproportionate
racial impact must be a proven predictor of ultimate job success to
avoid violating title VII. 212
There remains the question whether educational requirements
must be validated as job related in the same manner as written examinations. EEOC regulations define "test" to include
all formal scored, quantified or standardized techniques of assessing
suitability including specific qualifying or disqualifying personal histories

or backgrounds requirements, specific educational or work history requirements, scored interviews, biographical information, blanks, interviewers' rating scale, scored application forms, etc. 21 3

This would appear to mean that an educational requirement must be
shown to be valid as job related by techniques similar to those required for tests.
It is not clear whether courts have been as rigorous in applying the
standards for validation of job relatedness as the EEOC guidelines
suggest. In Georgia Power Co., the court found that the company had
not demonstrated a business necessity for the educational requirement for labor department employees. The company stressed the
need to read and understand increasingly technical maintenance
manuals, training bulletins and operating instructions. But the court
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 433.
Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Servs., 315 F. Supp. 506,510-11 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 918-19.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.2 (1974).
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did not accept data which showed that fewer non-high school
graduates had been promoted recently than high school graduates.
The court noted that this data only mirrored the company's requirement that all "laborers" who wished to be promoted to a higher position must have had a high school diploma and passed the required
tests in order to have been eligible for promotion. 214 The court
seemed to require more than a speculation or limited statistical data
to validate the requirements as job related.
In Castro v. Beecher,2 1 5 black and Spanish surnamed citizens of
Boston brought suit alleging among other practices that the educational requirement for appointment to the police department was racially discriminatory. The requirement could be met by graduation
from high school, by certificate of equivalency or by an honorable
discharge after three years of military service. After noting difficulty
in establishing whether the requirement had a racially disparate impact, the court found it to be "clearly valid." 2 16 Its validity rested not
upon the type of specific statistical study which would seem to be
necessary under the EEOC guidelines, but upon the 1967 Report of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice and the 1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders, both of which stressed the need for a high level of
education for police and urged that all personnel with general enforcement powers have baccalaureate degrees. 2 17 In another case,
however, a requirement that fire fighters have high school diplomas
was found to have a disparate impact on minorities and to be insufficiently job related. 2 18 Degree requirements from a particular institution with a history of excluding blacks have also been struck down. 219
There are, of course, situations in which an educational requirement is job related. An employer reasonably might want electrical
engineers, accountants and some other professional employees to hold
degrees in those fields. While the courts have been unwilling to accept speculative justifications, they do seem to have taken a common
sense approach to the validation of such requirements.
214. 474 F.2d at 919. After 1960, the company had instituted a policy requiring that
a person have a high school diploma or equivalent educational accomplishment in order
to be hired. In 1963 it added a battery of tests to this requirement, In 1964 the company
resumed hiring persons without these paper qualifications for "laborers," but maintained the requirements for those persons desiring a promotion out of the laborers
category. Id. at 911.
215. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972).
216. Id. at 735.
217. Id.
218. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
219. Strain v. Philpott, 331 F. Supp. 836 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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For civil service systems, educational requirements for managerial
or supervisory positions may be difficult to validate as job related and
to justify as a business necessity. Many civil service examinations,
particularly for higher ranking managerial and professional positions,
are "unassembled examinations" which give weight to educational attainments and to work experience. These tests come within EEOC
guidelines and would seem to be governed by restrictions placed
upon the use of work experience as a basis for appointment or promotion.
A requirement for particular work experience which has a disparate
impact upon racial groups must be shown to be job related. For jobs
which demand a reasonable degree of skill, expertise or knowledge,
relevant work experience is job related. A proper unassembled examination would specifically relate the work experience items of the
qualification form to skills needed to perform the particular job. Work
experience requirements have been prohibited when minorities have
been systematically excluded from a particular occupation because of
past discriminatory practices, 220 since the requirements should not
act to perpetuate the discriminatory status quo.
As part of suitability programs and before making hiring decisions,
public employers often examine police records, credit ratings, military discharges and previous job performance. 22 1 The use of any of
these items to exclude persons from public employment may, depending upon the location and circumstances, have a disparate impact
upon racial groups. For example, blacks as a class are arrested and
convicted more frequently than whites. 22 2 Blacks also may suffer from
poor credit ratings, less than honorable discharges or adverse personnel recommendations more often than whites. Because it has a disparate impact on racial groups, use of such information must be shown
to be job related.
Refusal to hire applicants because of their arrest records has been
found to be unlawful when the requirement of a clean record could
220. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Dobbins v.
Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
221. Approximately 73 percent of state and local governments responding to a
N.C.S.L. survey use arrest records and qualifications investigations in hiring. Survey of
Current Personnel Systems in State and Local Governments, Good Government 7
(Spring 1971).
222. See Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 472
F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), in which, on the basis of evidence before it, the district court
found that although blacks comprise but 11 percent of the total population, they account
for 27 percent of reported arrested and 45 percent of "suspicion arrests." 316 F. Supp. at
403.
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not be shown to be job related. 2 23 But a refusal to hire because of an

arrest record has been found to be job related for a hotel bellman
with access to guest rooms and luggage.2 24 More should be demanded than a showing that the particular job applied for necessitates
an element of honesty and trust. A charge which has been dismissed
or on which prosecution has been dropped should mean nothing unless the employer is able to show its predictive value for job
performance.

225

The EEOC has ruled that it is arbitrary, unnecessary

and unlawful to request information about the criminal record of an
individual on a job application form if the record is available from
226
other sources.
In certain situations where the job related requirement cannot be
met, the courts or the EEOC have declared unlawful a denial or termination of employment based upon fines imposed for gambling, 22 7
poor credit ratings, 228 an excessive number of wage garnishments, 229
a military discharge under less than honorable conditions for a city
fireman 230 and an adverse personnel reference without giving the applicant an opportunity to rebut charges. 231 These EEOC and court
decisions suggest that public employers must carefully scrutinize their
hiring requirements. Suitability standards which have a disparate impact upon racial groups must be shown to be job related and required
by business necessity.
EEOC and court decisions reviewing the hiring and promotion
practices of state and local governments and educational institutions
223, 316 F. Supp. at 403. See also Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir.
1972); EEOC No. 72-1460, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 718, 719 (1972).
224. Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd
mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972).
225. If there has been a conviction, however, specification of job criteria which are
affected by a conviction should be sufficient to show that the requirement is job related
and required by business necessity.
226. EEOC No. 72-1460, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 718 (1972).
227. EEOC No. 71-2682, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 25 (1971).
228. EEOC No. 71-0427, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 304 (1971).
229. Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
230. EEOC No. 74-25, 10 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 260 (1974).
231. EEOC No. 72-0947, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1305 (1972). Here, the Commission found the practice unlawful through a two-step process. First, when the employer
received an adverse employment report from a previous employer of a black applicant,
it was significantly more likely that the report would have been influenced by racial
discrimination than if the applicant were white. Thus, when the employer discharged
employees on the basis of this type of report, an appreciably greater percentage of
blacks were subjected to disqualification. The evidence before the Commission showed
that while blacks constituted 20 percent of the employer's work force, they constituted
33 percent of the total number of employees affected by the policy. The Commission
followed this reasoning in EEOC No. 72-2103, 4 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1169 (1972).
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do not seem to have applied the standards of title VII in a manner
significantly different from that applied to private employers. Indeed,
the decisions concerning police, firefighters, correctional officers
and teachers are not strikingly different than those concerning employees in the private sector. The legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 indicates that one purpose of the
amendments extending title VII's applicability to state and local governments and educational institutions was to give public employees
the same rights as those enjoyed by employees in private industry. 232
Under title VII, a hiring or promotion policy which has a disparate
impact on racial groups can be justified only by business necessity. 233
In Griggs, the Supreme Court was clear that a policy with discriminatory impact must be related to job performance to be tolerated. 234
This test of job relatedness has been interpreted as requiring more
than a simple business purpose; rather, the alleged purpose must be
so essential to the safe and efficient operation of a business as to override any racial impact.23 5 There can be no alternative practice which
would advance the business purpose equally well.236 Consumer preference is not an adequate business necessity for a practice with a racially disparate impact. 237 Of course, what is required to show business
necessity will vary depending upon the particular circumstances, but
the cases suggest that business necessity will be narrowly interpreted.
232.

See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).

233. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pike, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
234. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). In its discussion of
what constitutes "business necessity," the court in Johnson v. Pike, 332 F. Supp. 490
(C.D. Cal. 1971), recognized that annoyance, inconvenience and expense to the employer were not permissible grounds for adopting a discriminatory employment policy;
indeed, Congress was fully aware that such burdens might be imposed on employers in
ending racial discrimination when title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was passed. Id.
at 495-96.
235. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). At issue was the defendant's departmental seniority
system. After rejecting arguments that precedent and union pressure sufficed to justify
the system as a business necessity, the court discussed the argument that the practice
was justified because employees would perform a job more efficiently if they possessed
prior experience at other jobs within the same department. The court said that this
argument came "closest to stating a legitimate business purpose." 444 F.2d at 799. But
it was also rejected because seniority was not shown to be an efficient means of assuring prior job experience, even if such job experience indicated a higher degree of efficiency. Although an employee may be qualified for advancement, the opportunity for
such advancement may not be presented until well after that time. Id.
236. 444 F.2d at 798. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d
Cir. 1971).
237. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (1974). Cf. Diaz v. Pan American World Airways,
442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (sex discrimination in the
hiring of flight attendants).
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A public employer with few minority workers in an area with a
sizable minority population may have a duty to conduct recruitment
in a manner designed to reach and attract minority applicants. Title
VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire" on
racial grounds. 238 If a minority group member's chance of being hired
is reduced because of recruitment practices which principally reach
white applicants, it seems that the standards of title VII have been
violated.
Court and EEOC decisions support the proposition that employers
have a duty of fair recruitment.2 39 A racial imbalance in the work
force renders insufficient the practice of recruiting only at predominantly white institutions by word of mouth. 2 40 The recruitment
method must be designed to reach potential minority group applicants. It is not enough to employ media which serve primarily white
audiences.241 State and local employers with a racially imbalanced
work force must actively recruit minority group applicants. In determining whether such a racial imbalance exists, it would seem appropriate to look not at government-wide statistics, but at those of specific
departments or agencies with appointment authority and to examine
whether minority group employees hold principally menial or lowranking positions within those departments or agencies.
A substantial number of public employees are members of skilled
trades; in fact, the federal civil service has separate wage schedules
for laborers and for skilled and semi-skilled workers. State and local
employers with substantial numbers of skilled and semi-skilled workers may be particularly affected by standards under title VII. In skills
and trades in which discrimination has been practiced, the obligations
of the union and of the public employer to remedy these past practices may be substantial.
Under title VII, a union may not exclude or expel from membership or otherwise discriminate against an individual because of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin or age.2 42 Nor can a union operate
or join with an employer in the operation of an apprenticeship, train238. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
239. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Local 38, IBEW, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash. 1970), aff'd, 443
F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); EEOC No. 72-0599, 4 FAIR EMPL.
PRAC. CAS. 313 (1971).
240. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
241. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202, 1236 (W.D. Wash.
1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
242. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
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ing or retraining program in which discrimination is practiced. On the
contrary, a union must affirmatively protest racially discriminatory
hiring practices 243 and must support employees who are subjects of
discrimination.

2

1

If the practices of the public employer and the activities of the
union discriminate against minority employees by limiting seniority or
promotional opportunity, personnel practices otherwise appropriate
may be impermissible because they perpetuate previous discriminatory practices. For example, time actually worked by whites and
blacks in a particular job should be treated equally for seniority
purposes. 24 5 For this reason, union referral rules which stress work
experience in unions with a history of the exclusion of blacks have
24 6
been found incompatible with title VII.

Most of the civil service provisions do not base lay-offs or reductions in force solely on job tenure. 2 47 Other factors, including job
performance and preference for particular groups such as veterans,
are considered in addition to time in service. In fact, one objection to
a broader scope for collective bargaining in the public sector has been
that union seniority provisions would conflict with merit systems
which base appointment, promotion and retention on competence
rather than seniority. It seems clear, however, that most civil service
provisions do stress length of service in one manner or another. Often
the length of service is determined on the basis of total government
service 24 8 rather than by a particular job. Objection is made to seniority provisions stressing length of service in a job because they perpetuate previous discrimination. 2 49 Blacks who ultimately were able
to obtain positions in certain jobs often started at the bottom under
seniority rules, even when they actually had been employed longer
than many white workers. 250 Reduction in force provisions emphasizing length of public service rather than service in a particular job
243. EEOC No. 71-27, 2 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 867 (1970).
244. See Norman v. Missouri-Pacific R.R., 414 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1969) (challenge to
classification of all blacks as brakemen); United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (union forced to acquiesce in a new seniority system
which would have the effect of remedying past discrimination).
245. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1236 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
246. United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969);
Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
247. 5 C.F.R. §§ 351.501-.504 (1976).
248. Id. § 351.503.
249. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
250. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd in part, 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
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would avoid many of the pitfalls of private industry seniority

schemes. 251
Competitive examination as a method of appointment has come to
be closely identified with the civil service reform purposes of maintaining a qualified and an effective public service and impartially administering the law. Civil service examinations have been struck
down precisely because in many situations public employers have
been unable to establish, under reasonable standards, that the examinations actually do insure a qualified and efficient civil service. As the
EEOC regulations and the Supreme Court's decision in Washington
v. Davis2 52 suggest, the components of a valid examination may vary
depending upon the circumstances. Improved civil service examinations, resulting from judicial decisions striking down some examinations, will be one step toward civil service reform. Other benefits
accrue if these decisions lead to the discovery that present examination methods are inadequate, because attention and energy can be
directed to other methods of selecting qualified applicants. These
decisions focus inquiry not only upon testing procedures but also
upon the assumption underlying a qualified and efficient civil service.
Reducing the importance attached to examinations will increase the
necessity of utilizing probationary periods fairly and sensitively; it
may lead also to a restructuring of job security provisions. For example, rather than rely on the present system of a probationary period followed by tenure on good behavior, public employers could use
a probationary period followed by increasing term contracts of five,
fifteen and twenty years. Tenure would remain on good behavior and
termination after the initial probationary period would require a showing of cause. Retention decisions, however, would be made at specific
intervals. Such a scheme would protect civil servants while reducing
the fears of permanent tenure for unqualified employees. Moreover,
this process would place emphasis upon job performance. Rather than
reducing the quality of the civil service, reduced emphasis on examinations may increase it.
A more difficult problem arises from the function which competitive examinations have traditionally served in insuring the impartial
administration of the laws by removing partisan political affiliation as
a criterion for appointment. Examinations provide quantifiable standards by which applicants can be judged. By providing such standards, examinations reduce the discretion of appointing officers and
251. See generally Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1544 (1975).
252. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). See notes 199-204 & accompanying text supra.

19761

PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

restrict the area in which inappropriate political factors can be considered. Without such quantifiable standards, personal evaluations will
become more important and appointment based upon political patronage more difficult to police.
How important is the maintenance of examinations to the impartial
administration of the laws? The answer depends both upon how successful competitive examinations have been in reducing improper
political influence and the availability of alternative methods of control in civil service law. Many civil service positions are not subject to
competitive examination because of its impracticability. For these
positions, including positions such as attorneys, the problem of political patronage does not appear to be more severe than in the competitive service where the appointing officer retains considerable discretion and where certification and appointment practices open the door
to abuse. The record of the Nixon administration shows that widespread and extensive patronage appointments may take place despite
competitive examinations and the presence of a Civil Service Commission designed to protect the civil service.
As long as the reduced role of competitive examinations is not
equated with toleration of political patronage, the deleterious effects
of patronage appointments may be avoided. Bans on referrals of candidates by elected political officials and civil service commissioners,
prohibitions against the use of political influence in the appointment
of any civil servant, criminal and administrative sanctions for referrals
and for patronage appointments coupled with aggressive enforcement
by an agency independent of the executive can do much to prevent
the return of patronage.
Civil service law acts to insure the impartial administration of the
law in additional ways, including protection through conflict of interest provisions of the relationship between employees and citizens
and through citizen-initiated imposition of personal responsibility
upon employees under sanction provisions. The protection provided
public employees from the arbitrary disciplinary actions of their
supervisors is another way in which civil service law acts to insure the
impartial administration of the laws.
IV.

PREFERENCES FOR WOMEN AND MINORITIES

Perhaps the most explosive question concerning equal employment
opportunity in public employment is how far a public employer
should or may go in improving the employment opportunities for
women and minorities. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer
"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . .. because
of
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such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 25 3 This
provision establishes the basic policy of title VII and suggests that
hiring policies, including numerical hiring, which create the clear potential for discrimination against white or male applicants would be
unlawful. Other language in title VII is more specifically addressed to
preferential or numerical hiring:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer. . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of
such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin employed . . . in any community,
State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any com2 54
munity, State, section, or other area.
A.

Preferences as Remedies

For women or minorities who have been the victims of acts of discrimination which adversely affect their access or advancement in
employment, the judicial remedy may include steps such as preferential hiring or personnel practices designed to redress the impact of
discrimination. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,255 the Supreme Court
articulated both the anti-preference policy of title VII and the permissibility of preferential remedial action.
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job to
every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not
command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the
subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority
group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers
to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification. ...
.. . Congress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred
over the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and sex
2 56
become irrelevant.

253.
254.
255.
256.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 2000e-2(j).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 430-31, 436.
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In addition to emphasizing the neutrality principle of title VII, the
Court stressed the removal of artificial barriers and that Congress had
"directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment
2 57
practices, not simply the motivation.Other cases, like Griggs, have required changes in employer
seniority or personnel plans which, while not discriminatory themselves, acted to perpetuate the effect of previous discriminatory
practices. 2 58 The security offered by seniority plans keeps women and
minorities in the lower jobs to which they had been relegated previously. One remedial step available to courts is the restructuring of
the seniority system in a manner to compensate for past discriminatory practices.2 5 9 Although these steps may have the immediate effect
of granting preference to minorities or women, they are remedial in
nature, making whole those suffering from past discrimination. For
example, in United States v. Ironworkers Local 86260 the Ninth Circuit approved a district court decree requiring a union, found to have
operated a discriminatory referral system, to offer immediate referrals
to previous victims of discrimination and to recruit sufficient blacks to
comprise a 30 percent membership in its apprentice program.
Cases brought under constitutional or statutory provisions other
than title VII illustrate the permissibility of preference requirements
which are part of the remedy provided to redress previous discriminatory practices. In Carterv. Gallagher26 1 the Eighth Circuit approved
preferential hiring as an appropriate remedy for discrimination. The
district court had held that the Minneapolis Fire Department had
been engaged in racially discrimindtory employment practices and
procedures and had ordered an absolute minority preference for the
next 20 persons to be hired by the Department. The court of appeals,
relying partly on title VII precedents, 26 2 noted that. it had the power
257. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
258. Sec cases cited in note 220 supra.
259. The Supreme Court has recently held that it is appropriate under section 706(a)
,4 title VII to award seniority retroactive to the date of the job application in order to
redress injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976).
260. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). See also Heat & Frost
Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (ordering alternating black
and white referrals); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478
(W.D.N.C. 1970) (ordering drivers to be hired in ratio of one black to one white).
261. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
262. The court stated:
Although this case is not predicated upon Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and most of the cases that have dealt with the issue of remedying past discriminatory practices along with prohibiting present discriminatory practices are under that
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and duty to render a decree which would remedy both the effects of
past discrimination and bar future discrimination of a like nature.2 63
In evaluating the propriety of the trial court's order, the court articulated the concerns posed by an absolute preference and the consideration which necessitated affirmative relief by the court.
The absolute preference ordered by the trial court would operate as a
present infringement on those non-minority group persons who are
equally or superiorly qualified for the fire fighters positions; and we
hesitate to advocate implementation of one constitutional guarantee by
the outright denial of another. Yet we acknowledge the legitimacy of
erasing the effects of past racially discriminatory practices. To accommodate these conflicting considerations, we think some reasonable ratio
for hiring minority persons who can qualify under the revised qualification standards is in order for a limited period of time, or until there is a
fair approximation of minority representation consistent with the population mix in the area. Such a procedure does not constitute a "quota"
system because as soon as the trial court's order is fully implemented,
all hirings will be on a racially nondiscriminatory basis, and it could well
be that many more minority persons or less, as compared to the population at large, over a large period of time would apply and qualify for the
positions. However, as a method of presently eliminating the effects of
past racial discriminatory practices and in making meaningful in the
immediate future the constitutional guarantees against racial discrimina2 64
tion more than a token representation should be afforded.
Other cases have required preferential hiring or promotion as part
of the affirmative relief granted for discrimination in public employment.2 65 Among the remedies provided have been orders requiring
the hiring of blacks and whites alternately until a certain percentage
of an agency or department was black2 6 6 and the establishment of miAct, the remedies invoked in those cases offer some practical guidelines in dealing
with this issue.
452 F.2d at 329.
263. Id. at 328, quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1964).
264. 452 F.2d at 330-31 (citation omitted). In spite of the drawbacks inherent in an
absolute preference, the appellate court considered the district court's plan, which required that at least one out of every three fire department hirees would have to be a
minority individual until 20 minority persons had been hired. It also pointed out that
the mandatory provisions of the state statute would be overridden by the Supremacy
Clause.
265. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Commonwealth v. O'Neil,
473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); NAACP v.
Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
266. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d
614 (5th Cir. 1974).
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nority pools from which a certain percentage of current and future
267
vacancies and promotions were to be filled.
The difficulty with these preferential practices based upon a remedying of past employment discrimination is, as the court in Carter
points out, that they have been used in title VII contexts to remedy
discrimination against individuals and raise no issues of granting a
preference to any one class over another. 26 8 The individuals benefiting
from the remedy may not have been victims of past discrimination,
but the court noted that "the presence of identified persons who have
been discriminated against is not a necessary prerequisite to ordering
affirmative relief in order to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination." 269 This position seems sound. Otherwise, courts essentially would be unable to grant the kinds of affirmative relief necessary
to redress the effects of past discrimination. Moreover, courts have
acted to limit the effect of preferential hiring orders by insisting
upon a history of discrimination against a protected group, conditioning the order upon the availability of the group members in the geographic area, considering first whether other affirmative relief is adequate to overcome the effects of past discrimination, and limiting the
duration of such orders either in time or until a certain percentage of
2 70
the preferred group are hired.
Since these cases base the permissibility of preferential orders upon
the need to redress past discrimination, they could not be used to
support granting preferential treatment to minority groups or women
without a finding of past discrimination. Courts have been generally
unwilling to uphold preferential employment procedures when such a
finding has not been made. 2 71 A California court refused to uphold
the affirmative action plan of the City of Berkeley which eventually
would have made the percentage of each race and sex in public employment equal to the percentage of the race or sex in the total population of the city. 2 72 The court rested its decision upon a finding that
267. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482
F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d
725 (Ist Cir. 1972).
268. Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
269. 452 F.2d at 330.
270.

R. SMITH, H. EDWARDS & R. CLARK, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC

SECTOR 1180 (1974).
271. Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 357 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Cal.
1972). But see Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944

(1971).
272. Hiatt v. City of Berkeley, 10 FAIR EmPL. PRAC. CAS. 251 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Almeda 1975).
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the employment practices of the city were not discriminatory and that
the city for over a decade had pursued affirmative action programs
to attract and hire minority group members and women for city employment.
Of course, past discrimination can be defined so generally that any
preferential employment system could be sustained as a remedy to
redress past discrimination. The argument could appropriately be
made that women and minorities have traditionally suffered job discrimination in public employment; this discrimination has denied
generations of women and minorities the opportunity to be public
employees and the rightful rewards of such employment. To compensate for this discrimination, minorities and women must now be given
preference.
The history of public employment and the statistics concerning
women and minorities in public employment lend merit to the argument that past discrimination should be broadly defined. In light of
the cases which have been discussed, however, it is doubtful that this
argument would be accepted as the basis for a program of preferential
hiring in public employment. Moreover, the argument obscures a
number of other basic questions which must be resolved with respect
to the propriety of the practices of public employers which may be
appropriately used to increase the percentages of minorities and
women in public employment, and particularly in more responsible
and higher paying positions. Among the issues which must be resolved are the precise meaning of preference, the kinds of requirements which infringe to an unacceptable extent upon the rights of
whites or males or are inconsistent with the concept of merit in public employment, whether special consideration for women and
minorities conflicts with the purposes underlying civil service systems
and the manner in which preference or special consideration violates
basic constitutional provisions requiring equal protection of the law.
Only by addressing these issues can the public policy underlying affirmative action be articulated and the forms of preference or consideration be evaluated adequately.
B.

Use of Quotas, Goals and Timetables

A great deal of discussion has surrounded the use of quotas,
targets, goals and timetables in public employment. Some quotas in
federal employment are of long standing. For example, positions in
federal departments in the District of Columbia must be apportioned,
as nearly as practical, among the states.2 73 Although it rejects quotas
273.

5 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1) (1970). The apportionment provision does not apply to
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based upon race, the CSC has approved the use of goals and timetables in federal employment.2 74 A Commission memorandum of May
11, 1971, defines a goal as "a realistic objective which an agency endeavors to achieve on a timely basis within the context of the merit
system of employment."2 75 A quota, on the other hand,
"would restrict employment or development opportunities to members of a particular group by establishing a required number of proportionate representation which agency managers are obligated to
attain without merit system requirements [and which is] . . . incom-

patible with merit principles."2 7 6 Based upon these definitions, the
Commission regulations allow agencies to use goals and timetables "in
those organizations and localities and in those occupations and grade
levels where minority employment is not what should be reasonably
expected in view of the potential supply of qualified members of minority groups in the work force and in the recruiting area and available
2 77
opportunities with the organization.A useful way of analyzing the difference between goals and quotas
is to examine the way in which they affect an employer's hiring decisions. 278 A quota would require an employer to maintain a specific level
of minority employment; failure to meet this level would constitute
a conclusive presumption of discrimination and the proper sanctions
would apply automatically. On the other hand, a goal would be an
employment figure which, if not met, might constitute evidence of
discrimination, but additional evidence would be necessary before
sanctions would be invoked. "The more conclusive evidentiary impact of failing to satisfy a quota would therefore be more likely ...

to

affect the integrity of an employer's hiring practices."279 This analysis
is helpful in evaluating the potential impact of goals and timetables
upon employment decisions generally, even though they were developed in evaluating the government action against private contractors.
preference eligibles although they might be required to furnish evidence of residence

and domicile. Id. § 3306(a)(2).
274. For an analysis of the CSC's decision to authorize the use of goals and timetables in the Federal Equal Employment Program see Rosenbloom, The Civil Service
Commission's Decision to Authorize the Use of Goals and Timetables in the Federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Program, 26 W. PoL. Q. 236 (1973) [hereinafter cited

as Rosenbloom].
275. Id. at 249 n.31.
276. Id.

277. Id. at 248.
278. See Note, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1301 (1971).
279. Id.
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Failure to meet goals and timetables is only an indication of discrimination, but an employer's reluctance to come forward and explain why the goal or timetable was not met, particularly in the face of
statistical evidence of discrimination, could cause him to ignore other
employment considerations and to meet the goal. Balanced against
this risk is the initial purpose of a goal-affecting employment decisions by focusing upon reasonable and realistic levels of minority
group employment which the agency believes it should meet. When
the federal agency has the ability to set goals based upon broad
criteria, the risk of misusing goals is substantially diminished.
The CSC has made it clear that goals should not force the federal
employer to overlook other employment policies. In its May 11, 1971
memorandum, 28 0 the Commission emphasized that goals and timetables must not be interpreted as quotas by managers and supervisors. 28 1 Another memorandum sets out in greater detail the appropriate use of goals and timetables in state and local governments.
Dated March 23, 1973, this memorandum was sent to United States
Attorneys and to field representatives of the CSC, the EEOC, and
the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the Department of
Labor. It states a federal policy of approving the use of goals and
timetables by state and local governments but prohibiting the use of
quotas. The memorandum indicated that an employer who failed to
meet a quota would be subject to a sanction:
It would be no defense that the quota may have been unrealistic to start
with, that [the employer] had insufficient vacancies, or that there were
not qualified applicants, although he tried to obtain them through appropriate recruitment methods.
Any system which requires that considerations of relative abilities and
qualifications be subordinated to considerations of race, religion, sex, or
national origin in determining who is to be hired, promoted, etc. in
order to achieve a certain numerical position has the attributes of a
quota system which is deemed to be impermissible under the standards
282
set forth herein.
280. 2 CCH EMPL. PnAc. GUIDE 5090 (1971).
281. See Rosenbloom, supra note 274. An August 18, 1972 memorandum submitted

by the CSC to agency heads contained the following comment by President Nixon regarding the use of goals and timetables:
I agree that numerical goals, although an important and useful tool to measure progress which remedies the effect of past discrimination, must not be allowed to be
applied in such a fashion as to, in fact, result in the imposition of quotas, nor should
they be predicated upon or directed towards a concept of proportional representation.
2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE

5090, at 3165-66 (1972).

282. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Permissible Goals and Timetables in State and Local
Government Employment Practices 3 (Mar. 23, 1973).
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C. Conflict with Civil Service Provisions
Does special consideration for women and minorities in the employment practices of public employers conflict with the purposes
underlying civil service systems? A similar conflict between purposes
exists in the veterans' preference context. Although a number of
reasons have been given for veterans' preference, the principal purpose is to compensate the veteran for the distruption and dislocation
caused by military service. 2 8 3 A preference given to those otherwise

qualified, and which did not interfere with the fair, efficient and impartial administration of the laws, would not necessarily conflict with
merit principles or the purposes of civil service reform. As a policy,
veterans' preference has been maintained even though it may significantly reduce employment opportunities for others, including
women. Title VII provides that "[n]othing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating special rights or preference for veterans." 284
An analysis similar to that applied to veterans' preference will aid in
determining whether special consideration for minorities and women
in public employment decisions conflicts with the merit system.
Special consideration is intended not to suggest a quota but to describe the standards a public employer uses in making a personnel
decision to increase the representation of a minority group or of
women, particularly in higher paying and responsible positions. It
may vary from being one of many factors in reaching a decision to
increase representation, to being the controlling factor in giving preference to women and minority group members.
An example of how such consideration may be taken is Porcelli v.
Titus.2 8 5 In Porcelli, white teachers employed by the Newark Board
of Education brought suit alleging deprivation of their rights through
the abolition of a promotion list which since 1953 had provided for
oral and written examinations for anyone wishing to be a principal or
vice-principal in the system. It was contended that abolition of the
list discriminated against whites whose names had appeared on it.
At the time of the list's abolition, blacks comprised approximately
72.5 percent of the Newark students. Blacks held only 10 percent of
the administrative and supervisory positions, however, and only one
black was eligible on the promotion list for both principal and viceprincipal positions. Rather than relying upon the list, the Superinten283.
284.
285.

See notes 144-46 & accompanying text supra.
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-11 (1970).
431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
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dent of Schools recommended, and the Board of Education adopted,
appointments representing a total of 35 white appointments and 20
black appointments. Although the superintendent candidly admitted
that color was a criteria, it was only one of the factors utilized to
procure qualified individuals. This special consideration of blacks,
which relied upon both qualification to perform the job and the advantages to be gained by increasing the percentage of black administrators in a system with a substantially black student body, was upheld by the Third Circuit.286
While extensive preference schemes for veterans have been constitutionally sustained, the constitutionality of preferences for minorities and women is less clear. The debate and litigation surrounding
private contractors doing business with the government and the
minority enrollment programs of law schools help focus the constitutional and political issues surrounding special consideration for
women and minorities in public employment personnel decisions.
Under Executive Order 11246,27 and the regulations implementing it which require contractors doing business with the United States
to have affirmative action plans, the Department of Labor developed
plans establishing goals for minority employment by construction contractors within geographic areas. These plans have been sustained in
litigation, in part because they have been interpreted as establishing
employment goals rather than quotas. A district court in New Jersey
made this distinction clear:
Throughout this case the objectors to the implementing plan insist
that it sets up "quotas" and is therefore invalid; however, the Plan
merely sets up goals for minority employment. Sanctions cannot be imposed under the Plan if the contractors strive to meet these goals and
fall short. If good faith is present, no sanctions can be applied, and if
necessary a contractor may insist on a hearing as to non-compliance,
which hearing is of course subject to judicial review.2 88
In another case, the Third Circuit rejected a challenge to the
Philadelphia Area Plan as imposing racial quotas in violation of the
fifth amendment:
The Philadelphia Plan is valid Executive action designed to remedy the
perceived evil that minority tradesmen have not been included in the
labor pool available for the performance of construction projects in
286. Id.
287. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1974).
288. Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (D.N.J. 1970).
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which the federal government has a cost and performance interest. The
Fifth Amendment does not prohibit such action.289
The court later found that an historical reason for the exclusion of
available minority tradesmen from the labor pool was not a necessary
precondition to granting a remedy for the action which was based on
contract. This finding strongly suggests that affirmative action provisions need not respond to specific discriminatory activities but may
be imposed to satisfy the government's legitimate objective of substantial minority representation.
Constitutional arguments surrounding the minority admission
policies of state professional schools have raised many issues pertinent
to -affirmative action programs in public employment. Most professional schools, including law schools, have established minority enrollment programs. These programs give preference to minority applicants to increase the number of minorities in the legal profession,
to add diversity in law school classes and to redress the previous exclusion of minorities from professional opportunities.
In an amicus brief submitted in Defunis v. Odegaard290 by the
Anti-Defamation League, Professors Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland argued that the Washington Law School procedure of including a
separate admission process for minorities to whom a certain number
of seats in the class had been allocated constituted a racial quota. In
classifying applicants on a racial basis, the procedure was presumptively invalid under the equal protection clause; the benign intent of
the classification was not pertinent: In fact, they argued, quotas are
harmful to both blacks and whites, since whites are excluded and
quotas suggest that blacks are incompetent by granting them a special
privilege in order to compete. Moreover, the state of Washington
failed to show a compelling state interest for racial quotas. Cultural
disadvantage could not be correlated with minorities which were
given or denied preference. Nor could it be presumed that black attorneys would represent primarily the black community or that they
were necessarily better legal representatives of these persons than
29 1
nonblack lawyers.
In an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Harvard Law School,
Professor Archibald Cox argued that educational policy may appropriately consider race as a factor in a decision to admit or not admit.
289. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 177 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
290. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
291. See Brief for Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae, Defunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
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It submitted that offsetting the disadvantages of membership in a
minority group is a permissible object of state policy. Professor Cox
argued that the criteria for determining whether an applicant is qualified must not be confused with the criteria for actual selection. Qualification need not be determined exclusively by test scores or any
other specific predictor. A very large number of individuals may be
qualified to attend a professional school. At the stage of selection, the
educational and admissions policy of the school should be interrelated. He concluded that such practice is a permissible, if not a desirable exercise of educational policy. 29 2 By holding the case to be moot,
2 93
however, the Supreme Court left these issues unresolved.

D. Justificationsfor Special Consideration
Among the possible reasons for special consideration to minorities
and women are the effective elimination of ingrained discriminatory
habits and procedures (the elimination of discrimination theory); the
improvement of the economic position of minorities and women (the
economic justice theory); compensation for a long history of discrimination (the reparation theory); and the improvement of the character
of public service by making public service more representative of
groups within the population (the representative bureaucracy
294
theory).
According to the elimination of discrimination theory, special consideration for women and minorities is justified as a necessary method
of rooting out discriminatory practices. Given the history of discrimination of women and minorities in public employment, attacks upon
specific acts of discrimination will not alter the many subtle institutional practices which have a discriminatory effect. There are simply
too many ways in which discrimination can occur for the complaint
approach to be completely fruitful. The only way to alter these practices is to require employers to give special consideration to women
and minorities. In so doing, long-standing practices will be evaluated
and perhaps abandoned. Without such priority, discrimination in its
many and subtle forms is likely to continue.
Under the economic justice theory, special consideration is justified
because of the generally lower incomes for minorities and women and
292. See Brief for Center of Law and Education, Harvard University as Amicus
Curiae, Defunis v Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
293. The case was mooted because Defunis, who had been admitted to the law
school when the suit was commenced, had registered for his final quarter of law school
at the time the Supreme Court case was considered. The University of Washington Law
School stated it would grant Defunis his degree regardless of the outcome of the case.
294. See generally H. KRANZ, THE PARTICIPATORY BUREAUCRACY (1976).
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the resulting economic deprivation that is a source of social conflict.
Since public employment, particularly for higher paying positions,
provides a means of increasing the economic position and power of
these disadvantaged groups, special consideration to them is justified
by long-term societal goals which require economic justice for all
groups.
The reparations theory is related to the economic justice theory.
Under it, access to public employment is recompense for decades of
discrimination which have denied to minorities and women an opportunity to earn a reasonable livelihood and has relegated them to
lower paying positions. Special consideration for minorities and
women compensates for these effects and ends the economic waste
caused by under-utilization of human resources.
The representative bureaucracy theory rests upon the values to be
served by including substantial numbers of women and minorities at
all levels within the civil service. Because of the growth of public
employment, public bureaucracy exercises immense power over a
wide range of public programs often with minimal restraints by the
legislative, judicial or executive branches. These government institutions are less likely to show class or ethnic bias if they are broadly
representative of the composition of the population as a whole. Although disagreement might exist as to the yardstick that should be
used to determine whether a bureaucracy is representative-for example: general population percentages, general work force percentages, or percentages of client composition-the goal of representative
bureaucracy remains. Because women and minorities are substantially
under-represented in public employment, and particularly in more
responsible positions, special consideration should be given to these
groups so that a more representative bureaucracy may be obtained.
In the context of present equal employment opportunity programs,
the representative bureacracy theory is the most complex. Though
distribution of political power and responsiveness is a goal of a representative bureaucracy, some minorities may not be the politically
relevant ones. There are differences between racial minorities, whose boundaries are imposed by the majority of society, and
ethnic minorities, whose boundaries are self-imposed. To the extent
that the representative bureaucracy theory focuses upon a representation of blacks, Indians, Spanish, Asian-Americans and women, it is,
like both the economic justice and reparation theories, connected to
discrimination as a touchstone concept. Since they are the discriminated against and under-represented groups, particular attention must
be paid to them. Only the representative bureaucracy directly relates
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special consideration to the advantages gained for public employment.
In practice any program of special consideration will tend to mold
the theories together as policy justifications. The exemption of certain
employers of American Indians and the preferences for Indians in
federal employment illustrate how different policy considerations interrelate. Title VII exempts the preferential employment of Indians
by Indian tribes or by industries located on or near Indian reservations. 29 5 The exemption for Indian tribes is explained by the historic
relationship between the tribes and the federal government; the exemption for industries located on or near Indian reservations is best
explained in terms of giving economic justice to Indians. By exempting industries, the act serves to encourage the development of unique
employment opportunities.
Section 472 of title XXV provides that the Secretary of Interior may
establish standards for Indians who may be appointed without regard
to civil service laws to positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
involved in the administration or performance of services affecting
any Indian tribe. 29 6 It provides that qualified Indians are to be given
a preference in appointment to any Bureau vacancies. This preference
has been interpreted as applying only to appointments and promotions and not to reductions in force. 2 97 As the Tenth Circuit concisely
interpreted one version of the representative bureaucracy theory:
[Section 472] was intended to integrate the Indian into the government
service connected with the administration of his affairs . . . . [Ilt was
hoped that the B.I.A. would gradually become an Indian service predominantly in the hands of educated and competent Indians. 298
In Morton v. Mancari,2 99 non-Indian employees of the BIA brought
a class action challenging the employment preference for qualified
Indians. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had used the statute to
give preferences to Indians not only in hiring but also in promotion.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Act against a challenge
that the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 had by implication repealed the preference provision of the Indian Re-organization
Act. The Court emphasized the long history, dating back to 1834, of a
federal policy to provide a preference for Indians seeking jobs in the
295. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2 (i) (1970).
296. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
297. Mescalaro Apache Tribe v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 981 (1971).
298. 432 F.2d at 960.
299. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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BIA and its predecessors. 00 The reasons given for such preference
stressed the need for a representative bureaucracy combined with the
concepts of economic justice and reparation, and included a desire to
give the Indians a greater role in their own self-government, recognition of the government's trust obligation to the Indians, and the
necessity of reducing the friction caused by having outsiders administering matters that affect the tribal life of Indians. 301 The Court then
quoted from the House debate on the preference provision:
The Indians have not only been thus deprived of... the opportunity to
enter the more important positions in the service of the very bureau
which manages their affairs. Theoretically, the Indians have the right to
qualify for the Federal civil service. In actual practice there has been no
adequate program of training to qualify Indians to compete in these
examinations, especially for technical and higher positions; and even if
there were such training, the Indians would have to compete under
30 2
existing law, on equal terms with multitudes of white applicants.
Against this background the Court refused to find that the preference provision had been repealed by implication. It noted the 1964
exemptions concerning private employment of Indians and the passage of new Indian preference laws three months after passage of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
The Court also found that the preference did not constitute invidious racial discrimination violative of the fifth amendment due process
clause. It reasoned that the unique legal status of Indian tribes under
federal law, coupled with the plenary power of Congress to legislate
30 3
on behalf of Indian tribes, governed the resolution of the issue.
The Court viewed the preference not as a racial preference but as "an
employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the
needs of its constituent groups. It is directed to participation by the
3 0°4
governed in the governing agency."
The Court cautioned that the decision might have limited application even for Indians, because the lack of similar favoritism for any
other group made the legal status of the BIA unique. It further noted
that the preference did not apply to any government agency or activ300.
301.
302.

Id. at 541.
Id. at 541-42.
Id. at 543-44, quoting 78 CONG. REc. 11,729 (1934) (remarks of Congressman

Howard).
303. Id. at 551. The Court also noted that Congress' power to legislate derived from
"a history of treaties and the assumption of a 'guardian-ward' status .... ." Id.
304. Id. at 553-54.
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ity other than the Bureau, thereby making it unnecessary to consider
the more difficult question which would be presented were the Indians to be exempted from all civil service examinations. As long as a
rational relationship existed between the special treatment and Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians the legislative judgment
30 5
of Congress would not be disturbed.
It may be true that Congress has special authority with respect to
Indians which has been expressed in part through preference provisions. But this authority does not make the preference any less racial.
Indians are covered as individuals and protected by the provisions of
title VII. The preference appears acceptable because it is afforded to
qualified Indians, has limited impact, and is related to the government purpose of involving Indians in the administration of their own
affairs. As with veterans' preference, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent with a preference scheme if the individuals who are afforded preference are qualified to perform the job and the effect is
not to undermine the fair administration of the laws. Any plan of
preference or special consideration should be narrowly applied; however, compared to the substantial preferences afforded veterans, the
special consideration suggested for women and minorities is narrow
indeed.
CONCLUSION

Cases under title VII have successfully challenged a number of
traditional methods of determining competency and qualifications for
public employment. In particular, under title VII employment tests
have been struck down when they have a disparate impact on
minorities and are not job related. Competence becomes-as it
should-a more flexible standard and one more difficult to assess.
Rather than undercutting the competency of public service, these developments under title VII should strengthen it by forcing public administrators to focus upon the basic requirements for performance
and to apply these requirements individually. This emphasis upon the

individual assessment of competency should inure to the benefit of
women and minorities who have suffered in the past from more rigid
and less thoughtful qualification requirements.
With a new understanding of competency and qualification, any
plan of special consideration should be less in conflict with the merit
system and more consistent with a diverse and effective public service. The arguments for and against special consideration for profes305.

Id. at 554-55.
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sional school admission suggest how women and minorities might be
given special consideration in public employment without violating
the Constitution. Any woman or minority member appointed must be
qualified to perform the job. With the development of title VII, qualification should not be based upon any artificial test or other personnel requirement not properly related to the skills needed to perform.
Preference may take the form of goals and may include or allow consideration to be taken of race or sex when such consideration can be
shown to improve the position of women and minorities in public
employment and make the bureaucracy more closely reflect the percentage of the various components of our society. It should be easier
for a public employer to relate special consideration for women and
minorities to the quality of public service than to relate the extensive
preferences for veterans to improvements in the quality of the public
service. A public employer should be able to demonstrate that special
consideration of women and minorities will be more likely to develop
a representative and responsive bureaucracy. The need to redress the
historic exclusion of women and minorities from responsible positions
in public employment can be accommodated with the need for a qualified public service. Rather than creating a risk that the laws will be
unfairly or impartially administered, a policy recognizing the longstanding bias of public employment by creating a more diverse and
representative public service is likely to decrease the risk of unfairness.
Veterans' preference and equal employment opportunity are two
strong public policies which have affected the nature of public employment. Public policies of this nature need not be inconsistent with
civil service reform; properly interpreted and applied, they can
strengthen rather than weaken the fabric of the civil service laws.

